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84
Sackett
Santora
Savage
Sessums
Sims
Singleton
Smith
Stevens

Sweeny
Thomas
Tillman
Tittle
Tobiassen
Trombetta
Tubbs
Tucker

Turlington
Tyrrell
Walker
Westberry
Whitson
Whitworth
Williamson
Wilson

Winn
Wolfson
Woodward
Yancey
Zinkil

Nays-None

BB 120-A bill to be entitled An act relating to wrongful
death action; amending chapter 768, Florida Statutes, by adding
sections 768.16, 768.17, 768.18, 768.19, 768.20, 768.21, 768.22,
768.23, 768.24, 768.25, 768.26, and 768.27; providing for a right
of action on behalf of the survivors and the estate by the per
sonal representative of a decedent whose death is caused by
the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of contract or
warranty of any person; repealing sections 768.01, 768.02, and
768.03, Florida Statutes; providing an effective date.
-was taken up. On motion by Mr. D'Alemberte, the rules
were waived and HB 120 was read the second time by title.

Representatives Baker, Dubbin, Harris, and Shaw were re
corded as voting Yea and Representative Gallen was recorded
as voting Nay.
So the bill passed, as amended. On motion by Mr. Firestone,
the rules were waived and the bill was ordered immediately cer
tified to the Senate, after engrossment.
HB 718-A bill to be entitled An act relating to the depart
ment of legal affairs; providing for restitution for damages
caused by escapees and inmates of state institutions under the
department of health and rehabilitative services; providing an
effective date.
-was taken up. On motion by Mr. Mixson, the rules were
waived and HB 718 was read the second time by title.
The Committee on Rules & Calendar offered the following
amendment:
Amendment 1-On page 2, line 10, strike "1971" and insert:
1972
Mr. Mixson moved the adoption of the amendment, which was
adopted.
On motion by Mr. Mixson, the rules were waived and HB
718, as amended, was read the third time by title. On passage,
tho vote was:
Yeas-102
Mr. Speaker
Baker
Baumgartner
Birchtie1d
Blackburn
Brown
Burke
Caldwell
Carlucci
Chapman
C_a1k, Dick
Clark, J. R.
Conway
Crabtree
Craig
Crane
Culbreath
D'Alemberte
Danahy
Dixon
Dubbin
Earle
Elmore
Featherstone
Firestone
Fleece

February 1, 1972

Forbes
Fortune
Fulford
Gautier
Gibson
Gillespie
Glisson
Gorman
Grainger
Grizzle
Gustafson
Harris
Hartnett
Hector
Hess
Hodes
Hollingsworth
Holloway
Johnson
Jones
Kershaw
Lane
Libertore
Matthews, H.
Mattox
McDonald

Sims
Melvin
Singleton
Milburn
Mixson
Smith
Mooney
Stevens
Sweeny
Moudry
Thomas
Murphy
Tillman
Nease
Tittle
N ergard
Ogden
Tobiassen
Puole
Trombetta
Tubbs
Poorbaugh
Tucker
Powell
Randell
Turlington
Redman
Tyrrell
Walker
Reed
Reeves
Whitson
Renick
Whitworth
Rish
Williamson
Robinson, A. S. Wilson
Robinson, J. W. Winn
Wolfson
Ryals
Sackett
Woodward
Santora
Yancey
Zinkil
Savage
Sessums
Shreve

Nays-I
Harllee
Representatives Cherry, Hazelton, and Shaw were recorded
as voting Yea and Representative Gallen was recorded as voting
Nay.
So the bill passed, as amended. On motion by Mr. Mixson,
the rules were waived and the bill was ordered immediately
certified to the Senate, after engrossment.

The Committee on Rules & Calendar offered the following
amendment:
Amendment 1-On page 6, line 21, strike "January 1, 1972,"
and insert: July 1, 1972,
Mr. D'Alemberte moved the adoption of the amendment which
was adopted.
On motion by Mr. D'Alemberte, the rules were waived and
HB 120, as amended, was read the third time by title. On pas
sage, the vote was:
Yeas-101
Mr. Speaker
Andrews
Baker
Baumgartner
Birchfield
Blackburn
Brown
Burke
Caldwell
Carlucci
Chapman
Cherry
Clark, Dick
Clark, J. R.
Conway
Crabtree
Craig
Crane
Culbreath
D'Alemberte
Danahy
Dixon
Dubbin
Earle
Elmore
Featherstone

Firestone
Fleece
Forbes
Fortune
Fulford
Gautier
Gibson
Giliespie
Glisson
Gorman
Grainger
Grizzle
Gustafson
Harllee
Hartnett
Hazelton
Hector
Hess
Hodes
Hollingsworth
Holloway
Johnson
Jones
Kershaw
Lane
Libertore

Matthews, H.
Mattox
McDonald
Melvin
Milburn
Mixson
Mooney
Moudry
Murphy
Nease
Nergard
Ogden
Poole
Poorbaugh
Randell
Redman
Reed
Reeves
Renick
Rish
Robinson, A. S.
Ryals
Sackett
Santora
Savage
Shreve

Sims
Singleton
Smith
Stevens
Sweeny
Thomas
Tillman
Tittle
Tobiassen
Trombetta
Tubbs
Turlington
Tyrrell
Walker
Whitson
Whitworth
Williamson
Wiison
Winn
Wolfson
Woodward
Yancey
Zinkil

Nays-None
Representatives Gallen, Sessums, Shaw, and Tucker were
recorded as voting Yea.
So the bill passed, as amended. On motion by Mr. D'Alemberte,
the rules were waived and the bill was ordered immediately
certified to the Senate, after engrossment.
HB 2662-A bill to be entitled An act relating to criminal
procedure; creating §§901.27, 901.28, and 901.29, authorizing an
arresting officer to issue a citation to appear in court in lieu of
taking a person before a magistrate in misdemeanor cases;
amending §901.06 and 901.23, Florida Statutes, as amended by
chapter 70-339, Laws of Florida, releasing officer from duty to
take a person before a magistrate when a citation to appear is
issued; providing an effective date.
-was taken up. On motion by Mr. Firestone, the rules were
waived and HB 2662 was read the second time by title.
The Committee on Rules & Calendar offered the following
amendment:
Amendment 1-In title, line 9, after the semicolon insert:
providing a penalty;
Mr. Firestone moved the adoption of the amendment, which
was adopted.
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Dear Henry:
I agree with your observation that the remarriage amendment
to §768.21 of the Wrongful Death Act is not only wrongly
designated as paragr.a�h (c), but also l&cks meaning in the
context of subsection (6). I remain open to constructive
suggestion, but my present thought is that this can only be
corrected by legislative act. Let me trace the history for
you.
The amendment, in slightly different language, was first
proposed by Senator Jl'lcCJ.ain when H.B. 120 was before the
Senate Judiciary Civil "A" cormnittee during the 1971 session.
That proposal was to insert similar language at line 24 of
page 4, which would put it at the end of subsecti0n (2),
providing for recovery by the surviving spouse for loss of
decedent's companionship and protection, etc. Unfortunately,
H.B. 120 died on the Senate calendar and the araendment was
never adopted.
Although the 1971 bill history is instructive in telling us
where the amendment should have been inserted, I doubt tha-c
it would justify our moving the provision editorially. My
reluctance is reinforced by the circumstance that the pro
vision is.specifically designated as paragraph (c). This
designation is not, of course, binding on us. Hovever, it
does indicate pretty cleurly the legislative inteI1t, however
misguided, to insert the amendment at that particular plac-3.
Sincerely,

�Ernest E. Means, Director
Division of Statutory Revisicn
EEM:mop
cc

Messrs. Trawick, Grisse�t, D'Alemberte
and Hopping
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-was read· the second time in full. On motion by Senator
Horne, SR 1137 was adopted. The vote was:

de la Parte
Ducker
Fincher
Gong
Graham
Gunter
Haverfield
Henderson
Hollahan
Horne
Johnson (29th)
Johnson (34th)

Karl
Knopke
Lane
Lewis (33rd)
Lewis (43rd)
McClain
Myers
Ott
Plante
Pope
Poston
Reuter

Saunders
Sayler
Scarborough
Stolzenburg
Trask
Ware
Weber
Weissenborn
Williams
Wilson

Nays-None
Co-Introducers
By permission Senators Arnold, Barro�, Barrow, _Beaufort,
Bell, Bishop, Boyd, Brantley, Broxson, Childers, Damel, Deeb,
de la Parte, Ducker, Fincher, Gong, Graham, Gunter, Haver
field Henderson, Hollahan, Horne, Johnson (29th), Johnson
(34th), Karl, Knopke, Lane, Lewis (33rd), Lewis (43rd), Mc
Clain, Myers, Ott, Plante, Pope, Poston, Reuter. Saun<it>;s,
Sayler, Scarborough, Stolzenburg, Trask, Ware, Weber, Weis
senborn, Williams and Wilson were recorded as co-introducers of
SR 1137.
The President introduced the family of Allen Morris to the
members of the Senate and requested former recipients of Allen
Morris awards to escort Mr. Morris to the rostrum. Senators
Barron, Karl, de la Parte, Barrow, Pope, Horne and Holl:ihan
accompanied Mr. Morris to the rostrum where the President
presented to him on behalf of the Senate, a copy of SR 1137.
The Select Committee on Executive Suspensions was excused
to resume its hearing.

Amendment 1-On page 2, line 9, strike "or adjacent to"
On motion by Senator Ware, by two-thirds vote HB 104 was
read the third time by title, passed and certified to the House.
The vote was:
Yeas-28
Mr. President
Bell
Bishop
Brantley
Daniel
Deeb
Ducker

Gong
Graham
Haverfield
Henderson
Hallahan
Horne
Johnson (34th)

Knopke
Lane
Lewis (33rd)
Pope
Poston
Saunders
Sayler

Barron

Childers

Scarborough
Stolzenburg
Trask
Ware
Weissenborn
Williams
Wilson

Nays-3
Arnold

By unanimous consent Senators McClain, Johnson (29th),
Boyd and Myers were recorded as voting yea.
HB 120-A bill to be entitled An act relating to wrongful
death action; amending chapter 768, Florida Statutes, by adding
sections 768.16, 768.17, 768.18, 768.19, 768.20, 768.21, 768.22,
768.23, 768.24, 768.25, 768.26, and 768.27; providing for a right
of action on behalf of the survivors and the estate by the per
sonal representative of a decedent whose death is cause by
the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of contract or
warranty of any person; repealing sections 768.01, 768.02, and
768.03, Florida Statutes; providing an effective date.
-was read the second time by title.

On page 2, line 2 insert the following: It is also the legisla
tive intent that when a personal injury to the decedent results
in his death, no action for the personal injury shall survive.

HOUSE BILLS ON SECOND READING
Consideration of HB 1823 was deferred.
HB 3271-A bill to be entitled An act relating to elections;
changes in precinct boundaries; amending §98.031(1), Florida
Statutes, to authorize the alteration of precincts by boards of
county commissioners whenever necessary; providing an effec
tive date.
-was read the second time by title. On motion by Senator
Horne, by two-thirds vote HB 3271 was read the third time by
title, passed and certified to the House. The vote was:
Yeas-33
Deeb
Ducker
Gong
Graham
Haverfield
Henderson
Hollahan
Horne
Johnson (34th)

The Committee on Transportation offered the following
amendment which was moved by Senator Poston and failed:

The Committee on Judiciary-Civil A offered the following
amendment which was moved by Senator Barron:

The Senate resumed-

Mr. President
Arnold
Barron
Beaufort
Bell
Bishop
Boyd
Brantley
Childers

all authorized enforcement officers to order removal of ves
sels; providing an effective date.
-was read the second time by title.

Yeas-46
Mr. President
Arnold
Barron
Barrow
Beaufort
Bell
Bishop
Boyd
Brantley
Childers
Daniel
Deeb

255

Knopke
Lane
Lewis (33rd)
McClain
Pope
Poston
Saunders
Sayler
Scarborough

Stolzenburg
Trask
Ware
Weissenborn
Williams
Wilson

Nays-None
By unanimous consent Senators Myers, Daniel and Johnson
(29th) were recorded as voting yea.
HB 104-A bill to be entitled An act relating to regulation
of boats; amending Section 371.021 (1), Florida Statutes to in
clude barges as vessels; amending Section 371.503, Florida
Statutes, relating to interference with navigation to include
anchored vessels as navigational hazards; amending Section
371.67, Florida Statutes, relating to enforcement to authorize

On motion by Senator Barrow, further consideration of
HB 120 with pending amendment was deferred.
HB 2446-A bill to be entitled An act relating to salt water
fisheries; amending §370.16(16)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes;
providing that oysters less than the prescribed legal size may
be placed on the culling board of a vessel; reducing the allow
able percentage of small oysters includable in an oyster cargo
or lot from twenty-five percent (25%) to fifteen percent
(15%); adding paragraph (g) to §370.16(16), Florida Statutes;
prohibiting the sale of oysters less than the prescribed legal
size; providing an effective date.
-was read the second time by title.
The Committee on Natural Resources and Conservation of
fered the following amendment which was adopted on motion
by Senator Knopke:
Amendment I-In Section 1, line 2, page 2, after "oysters."
(end of sentence) add the following: Oysters shall only be
bagged or placed in containers at the establishment of a whole
sale dealer in the county of the oysters' origin, provided, how
ever, that when a county line divides a body of water, the
oysters may be transported for bagging to the establishment
of a wholesale dealer in any of the counties.
The Committee on Natural Resources and Conservation of
fered the following amendment which was adopted on motion
by Senator Knapke:
Amendment 2-In Section 1, line 19, page 2, strike: "up the"
and the rest of the paragraph which includes all of lines 20,
21 and 22 and add: to determine the percentage of under
sized oysters, one sample bushel to be taken at random from
the cargo of oysters and if a total of undersized oysters

JOURNAL OF THE SENATE

264-

Antendment 2-On page 2, immediately following line 29
insert the following: Any supplemental agreement shall not
exceed ten per cent (10%) of the original contract amount with
out prior approval of the majority of the cabinet.
The Committee on Transportation offered the following
amendment which was adopted on motion by Senator Poston:
Amendment 3-On page 3, line 3 strike "structures" and in
sert: facilities
On motion by Senator Wilson the following amendment was
adopted:
Amendment 4-On page 3, line 10, strike "upon becoming a
law" and insert: July 1, 1972
On motion by Senator Poston, by two-thirds vote SB 330
as amended was read the third time by title, passed and ordered
engrossed, The vote was:
Yeas-33
Mr. President
Arnold
Barron
Barrow
Beaufort
Bell
Bishop
Brantley
Broxson
:Nays-None

Childe�s
Daniel
Ducker
Graham
Haverfield
Hollahan
Horne
Knopke
Lane

Lewis i33rd)
Lewis (43rd)
McClain
Myers
Plante
Pope
Poston
Reuter
Saunders

Sayler
Scarborough
Stolzenburg
Trask
Ware
Wilson

February 24, 1972

SPECIAL ORDER
On motion by Senator Henderson, the rules were waived and
consideration of SB 432 was deferred, the bill retaining its
place as a special and continuing order of business.
THIRD READING
Consideration of SB 461 was deferred.
SB 300-A bill to be entitled An Act relating to certification
of speech pathologists and audiologists; amending section 468.145, Florida Statutes, by adding subsection 468.145( 4); provid
ing for the department of education to waive examination and
educational requirements for applicants who are certified to
teach speech pathology and audiology and were so certified on
July 9, 1969; providing an effective date.
-was taken up pending roll call.
On motion by Senator Trask the following amendment was
adopted by two-thirds vote:
Amendment 3-On page 1, line 26, strike the period and
insert: in the State of Florida.
On motion by Senator Lewis (43rd) the following amend
ment was adopted:
Amendment 4-On page 1, line 9 in title and line 22, strike
"examination and"

By unanimous consent Senators Weissenborn, Gunter, Wil
liams, Johnson (34th) and Johnson (29th) were recorded as
voting yea,

On motion by Senator Lewis (43rd), SB 300 as amended
was read by title, passed and ordered engrossed. The vote
was:

HB 120-A bill to be entitled An act relating to wrongful
death action; amending chapter 768, Florida Statutes, by adding
sections 768.16, 768.17, 768.18, 768.19, 768.20, 768.21, 768.22,
768.23, 768.24, 768.25, 768.26, and 768.27; providing for a right
of action on behalf of the survivors and the estate by the per
sonal representative of a decedent whose death is caused by
the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of contract or
warranty of any person; repealing sections 768.01, 768.02, and
768.03, Fforida Statutes; providing an effective date.
-was taken up with pending amendment which failed.

Yeas-30
Arnold
Beaufort
Bell
Bishop
Brantley
Childers
Daniel
Deeb

de la Parte
Ducker
Graham
Gunter
Haverfield
Henderson
Horne
Johnson (34th)

Knopke
Lewis (33rd)
Lewis ( 43rd)
McClain
Myers
Ott
Plante
Pope

Postim
Reuter
Scarborough
Stolzenburg
Trask
Ware

Nays-6
Barron
Broxson

Hollahan
Lane

Sayler

Wilson

The Committee on Judiciary-Civil A offered the following
amendment which was adopted on motion by Senator Barron:
Amendment 2-On page 5, line 19 insert: (c) Evidence of re
marriage of the decedent's surviving spouse is admissible.
On motion by Senator McClain, by two-thirds vote HB 120
as amended was read the third time by title, passed and certified
to the House. The vote was:
Yeas-38
Mr. President
Arnold
Barron
Barrow
Beaufort
Bell
Bishop
Boyd
Brantley
Broxson

Childers
Daniel
Ducker
Graham
Gunter
Haverfield
Henderson
Hollahan
Horne
Johnson (29th)

Nays-2
Pope

Williams

Johnson (34th)
Knopke
Lane
Lewis (33rd)
Lewis (43rd)
McClain
Myers
Ott
Plante
Poston

Reuter
Saunders
Sayler
Scarborough
Stolzenburg
Trask
Ware
Wilson

By unanimous consent Senator Weissenborn was recorded as
voting yea.
Consideration of CS for HB 3020 was deferred.

By unanimous consent Senators Johnson (29th) and Weis
senborn were recorded as voting yea.
On motion by Senator Hollahan, SB 461 was removed from
the calendar and re-referred to an appropriate committee.
The bill was recommitted to the Committee on Judiciary
Criminal.
SECOND READING
Pre-emptive Order
SB 176-A bill to be entitled An act relating to bulkhead
lines in certain counties, repealing subsection 253.135 (3), Flor
ida Statutes to delete exception provided therein.
-was read the second time by title.
Senator Scarborough presiding.
The President presiding.
Senator Lane moved that further consideration of SB 176
be deferred.

· · ·· . . · .By Senator de la Part.e

Prefiled March 1, 19'!1

1
2

S
A bill to be entitled
4 AN ACT relating to wrongful death action;
creating §§768.16, 768.17, 768.18 768.19,
5
6
768.20, 768.21, 768.22, 768.23, 768.24,
7
768.25, 768.26, and 768.27, Florida Statutes; providing for a right of action on
8
behalf of the survivors and the estate
9
10
by the personal representative of a dell
cedent whose death is caused by the
wrongful act. negligence, default, or
12
breach of contract or warranty of any
13
person; repealing §§768.01, 768.02, 768.03
14
and 768.04, Florida Statutes, which provide
15
16
for a right of action for wrongful death
17
and procedures relating thereto; provid18
ing an effective date.
19 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of
20 Florida:
21
Section 1. Sections 768.16, 768.17, 768.18,
22 768.19, 768.20, 768.21, 768.22, 768.23, 768.24,
23 768.25, 768.26, and 768.27, Florida Statutes, are
24 created t.o read:
25
768.16 Short title.-Sections 768.16 through
26 768.27 may be cited as the "Florida wrongful death
27 act."
28
768.17 Legislative intent.-It is the public
29 Policy of the state t.o shift the losses resulting
30 when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of the
31

1 ..

r-r,•,

,,,... .. _

....

.

..

I

. J

1 decedent t.o the Wl'Ollgdoer� Section!I 768.16 through
2 768.27 are remedial and shall be liberally construed.

s

768.18 Definitions.-As used in sections
4 768.16 through 768.27:

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

"Survivors" means the decedent's spouse, ·
minor children, parents, and, when partly or wholly
dependent on the decedent for support or services,
any blood relati\res and adoptive brothers and sisters.
It includes the illegitimate child of a mother, but · : · j
not the illegitimate child of the father unless the
father has recognized a responsibility for the child's
· ·· · ·
support.
(1)

,,
13
(2) ''Minor children means unmarried children
14 under twenty-one (21) years of age. 15
(8) "Support'' includes contributions in kind
16 as well as money.

.

17
18
19
20
21
22

(4) "Services" means tasks, usually of a .
, .
household nature� regularly performed by the decedent
that will be a necessary expense to the survivors of
the decedent. These services may vary according t.o
the identity of the decedent and survivor and shall
be determined under the particular facts of each case.

2S
24
25
26
27
28
29
80

(6) "Net accumulations" means the part of the .
decedent's expected net business or salary income,
including pension benefits, that the decedent probably
would have retained as savings and left as part of
his estate if he had lived his normal life expectancy.
Net business or salary income is the part of the ,
decedent's probable gross income after taxes,

81

1
2
8
4

excluding income from biv-eMntelt� -continuing-beyond·-..:
death, tthat remains after deducting-the decedent's
personal expenses and support of survivors excluding
contributions in kind.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
18
14
15

768.19 Right of action.-When the death of
a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence,
default, or breach of contract or warranty of any
person, including those occurring on navigable waters,
and the event would have entitled the person injured
to maintain an action and recover damages if death
had not ensued, the person or watercraft that would
have been liable in damages if death had not ensued
shall be liable for damages as specified in this act
notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
although death was caused under circumstances consti
16 tuting a felony.

17
768�0 Parties.-The action shall be brought
18 by the decedent's personal re resen · e, whoshall
19 re er or e nefit of the decedent'yugiyoq

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

aiia estate all damages, as specified in this act,

�used ,:,y the injury resulting in death. When a
personal injury to the decedent results in his death.
no action for the personal injury shall survive, and
any such action pending at the time of death shall
abate. The wrongdoer's personal representative shall
be the defendant if the wrongdoer dies before or
pending the action. A defense that would bar or
28 reduce a survivor's recovery if he were the plaintiff
29 may be asserted against him, but shall not affect
80

81

.

s

1 the recovery of any other survivor.
2

768.21 Damages.-All potential be neficiaries

3 of a recovery for wrongful death, including the·
4 decedent's estate, shall be identified i n the com5

6
7

8
9

10

11
12

13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20

21

22
23
24
25
26

27
28
29
30

plaint and their relationships to the decedent
.,
shall be alleged. Damages may be awarded as f ollows :

er,_t��lµ�
(1) �SL
��;;�
lo
st s u
an d s e
m he date of
c
r
t
� :: ::� �::- -f:_:: =� =� l'Vl�� ���: ::;�� ���w:a
cedent's injn:cy to bia death, w1 interest and
�loss of support andservices fro m the d ate of
death and reduced to present v alue. In ev a luating
loss of support and services, the survivor's relationship to the de cedent, the amount of the decedent's
probable n et income av ailable for distribution to the
particular survivor, and the replacement v alue of the
decedent's se rvices to the survivor may be considered.
In computing the duration of future losses, the joint
life expecta ncies o f the survivor and the decedent ,
and the period of minority in the case of healthy
minor children may be considered.
;:

(2) The surviving spouse may also recover tor
loss of the decedent's companionship an d protection
and f or mental pain ·and suffering from the d ate of
injury.
(3) Minor children of the decedent may also
recover for lost paren tal companionship, instruction,
and guidance and for men tal pain and suffering from
the date of injury.
(4)

Each parent o f a deceased minor child may

31

4.

1
2
3
4

6
6

7

8
9

10

11
12

13
14
16
16

17

18
19
20

also recover for mental pain and suffering from the
date of injury.
(5) Medical or funeral expenses due to the
decedent's injury or death may be recovered by a
survivor who has paid them.

(6) The decede nt's personal represe ntative
may recover for the decedent's estate the following:

( a) Loss of earnings of the deceased from
the d ate of injury to the d ate of death, less lost
support o f survivors excluding contributions in kind,
with interest. If the decedent's survivors include
a surviving spouse or lineal descend ants, loss of
net accumulations beyond death and reduced to present
v alue may also be 'recovered.
(b) Medical or funer al expenses due to the
decedent's injury or death th at have become a charge
against his estate or th at were paid by or on beh alf
of decedent, excluding amounts recoverable under
subsection (6).
(7) All awards for the decedent's estate are

21 s ubject to the claims of creditors who h ave complied

22
23

24
26
26

with the requirements of probate law concerning
claims.

768.22 Form of verdict.-The amounts awarded ·
to each survivor and to the estate shall be stated
separately in the verdict.

27
768.23 Protection of minors and incompetents.
28 The court may put in trust or provide other protec
29 tion for any amount awarded for the be nefit of a
80 minor child or an in competent.
81

1
2
8
4
5
6

768.24 . Death of� ·aurrivor bef� judimeiil� ...
A survivor's death before final judgment shan limit
the survivor's recovery t.o lost support and services '. .to the date of his death. The personal representative
shall pay the amount recovered to the personal representative of the deceased survivor.

7
8
9
10
11
12

768.25 Court approval of settteinents.�Whiie ·,
an action under this act is pending, no settlement
as to amount or apportionment among the beneficiaries
which is objected to by any survivor or which affects
a survivor who is a minor or an incompetent shall be
effective unless approved by the court. •

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

768.26. Litigation expenses.-Attorneys' fees
and other expenses of litigation shall be paid by,,
the personal representative and deducted from the · · '
awards to the survivors and the estate in proportion .
to the a�ount awarded to them, but expenses·inc�rred ._
for the benefit of a particular survivor or the
estate shall be paid from their awards.:

.,

20
768.27 Effective date.-Sections 768.16 :
21 through 768.27 shall take effect on January 1, 1972,
22 and shall not apply to deaths occurring before that.
23 date.
24
Section 2. Sections 768.01, 768.02, 768.08,
25 and� Florida Statutes, are repealed when this
26 act takes effect.

LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BUREAU SUMMARY
Amends Chapter 768, F. S., by adding Sections 768.16 through
768.27, F. S., to be cited as "Florida Wrongful Death Act."
Provides that when death of a person is caused by wrongful act,
including those on navigable wat.ers, and which would have enti
tled person to recover damages if death had not occurred, person
or watercraft shall be liable for damages. Provides 1�n
shall be brona:bt »¥ lioasdant's Pffl'§OD8] remisevti£ixe 7th
recovery
benefit of §PrxiYPm and decedent's estate. Actions
for person injuries of decedent shall abate. Damages may be
awarded for loss o
services to each surviv •

';f

,
en
al
p
,
of settlements where survivor objects, and attorneys' fees paid
out of award. Repeals Sections 768.01, 768.02, 768.03 and 768.04,
F. S., the present basis of wrongful death actions. Effective
January 1, 1972.
Similar to House Bill No. 120.
Similar to 1970 Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1242.

6

'· · · ' , · · �; ' ·' tf Representative D'
Alembet'tt!
y
.
.� .1' .... �,p_

. ,..

.

·

1

;.:-� ·=····i.·:p�

1
2
3
A bill to be entitled.
_
4 AN ACT, relating to wrongful death action·; ·. :·· i· 1
5
6
7
8

9

10
11

12

13
14
,15
16
17

· amending t:hapter 768, Florida Statutes,
by adding sections 768.16, 768.17,, , ·~,. •,, : :1
.. · 768.18, 768.19, 768.20, 768.21. 768.22,
'768.23, 768.24, 768.25, '768.26, ·and
768.27; providing for a right of action •'

on behalf of the survivors and the
estate by the personal representative .
of a decedent whose death ia caused by
.: the wrongful act, negligence, default,
or breach of contract or warranty of

any person; repealing sections 768.01,
768.02; and 768.03, Florida Statut.es;: / .

providing an effective date.

18 Be It Enacted by the Legisiature
19 · Florida:
t,

·

of the State ot .

20 ··· Section 1� Chapter 768; Florida Statu�s, is · ·: ,,:_.
21. amended bt adding sections 768.16, 768.17, 768.18, : �22 · · 768.19, 768.20, 768.21, 768.22, 768.23. 768.24,
23 768.25, _768.26, and 768.27 to read:
24
25
26

; 768.16 · Shott title.-Sections 768.16 through: :, · .-.
768.27 tnay be cited as the "Florida wrongful death ..
'' -·,r. · ,
act." ·

27
768.17 Legislative intent....;.tt is the public···:' 1 :. · : · -· • ·
28 policy ot the state to shift the losses resulting · · '-' : :
29 when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of the
30
81

. tl .

1

1
2

decedent to the wrongdoer. Sections :168.16 through
768.27 are remedial and shall be liberally construed.

3
4

768.18 Definitions.--As used in sections
768.16 through 768.27:

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

(1) "Survivors" means the decedent's,'SjJottse, -_,
minor children, parents, llnd, when partly ·or wholly
dependent on the deced�nt for support or services,
any blood relatives and adoptive brbthers and Sisters.
It includes the illegitimate child of a mother, but
not the illegitimate child of the father unll!SS the
father has recognized a responsibility for the ·child's
.. · - , i , •• : ..
support.
I

13
14

•••_,

.

15
16

t

•II

.. '' �,

:'

: i •

(2) "Minor children" means unmanied ·children
under twenty-one (21) years of age..
•

.'

-·1· .• • ••

.

(3) "Support" includes contributions in kind
., , - :·.. ,, ... ,, - . •,,,
as well as money.

-·

•·\

(5) "Net accumulations" means the part of the
decedent's expected net business or .salary income,
including pension benefits, that the decedent probably ·
would have retained as savings and left as part of
his estate if he had lived his normal life expectancy.
N�t business or salary income is the part of the
decedent's probable gross income after taxes, , _. ,

2

excluding income from irlvestments continuing beyond
death, that remains after deducting the decedent's
personal expenses and support of survivors excluding
contributions in kind.. ·c • • ·, •• • • • , ·, , , • , . • , •

5
768.19 ·Right of action.-When the death of·. _
• 6 , a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, •
7 default, or breach of contract or warranty of any
8 person/ including those occurring on navigable wa�rs,
9 and the event would have entitled .the person irijured
10 to maintain an action and recover damages if death·
11 · -had not ensued, the person ·or· watercraft that would
12 have been liable in damages if death had not ensued·
13 • · shall be liable for damages -as specified in this act : •
14· .- notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
15 -although death was caused under circumstances consti, · • ··
16 ' tu.ting a felony,
• "7

17
(4) "Services" means tasks, usually of a ·
18 household nature, regularly performed by the decedent ,
19 that will be a necessary expense to the survivors of
20 the decedent. These· services may vary according to
21 the identity of the decedent and survivor and shall
22 be determined under the particular facts of each case.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

1
2
3
4

1,.- ;',

I

•,-"f

,'•

'·

'

17..
768.20, Parties.--The action ·shall be brought·
18 r· by the decedent's personal representative, who shall ·
19 recover for the benefit of the decedent's survivors
20 and estate all damages, -as specified in this act, .
21 caused by the injury resulting in death. When a
22 personal injuty to the decedent results in his death,23 · no ac_tion for the personal injury shall survive, and
24 · · any such action- pending at the time of death shall
25 abate. The wrongdoer's personal representative shall
26 be the defendant if the wrongdoer dies before or
27 pending the action. A defense that would bar or
28. • reduce a survivor's recovery if he were the plaintiff '.
29 may be asserted against him, but shall not affect
30

31

3

1

the recovery of any other survivor. ··

2
3
4
5
6

· 768.21 Damages.-All potential beneficiaries
of a recovery for wrongful death, including the
decedent's estate, shall be identified in the complaint and their relationships to the decedent
shall be alleged. Damages may be awarded as follows:

7
(1) Each survivor may recover the value of•·
8 lost support and services from the date of the de9 cedent's injury to his death, with interest, and
10 future loss of support and services from the date of
11 death and reduced to present value. In evaluating
12 loss of support and services, the survivor's relation13 ship to the decedent, the amount of the decedent's
14 probable net income available for distribution to the
15 particular survivor, and the replacement value of the
16 decedent's services to the survivor may be .considered.
17 In computing the duration of future losses; the joint
18 'life expectancies of the survivor and the decedent
19 and the period of minority in the case of healthy ·
20 minor children may be considered.
21
(2) The surviving spouse may also recover for
22 loss of the decedent's companionship at1d protection
23 and for mental pain and suffering from the date of •
24 · injury.
25
26
27
28

(3) Minor children of the decedent may also
recover for lost parental companionship, instruction,
and guidance and for mental pain and suffering from
the date of injury.

29
30
31

(4) Each parent of a deceased minor child may
4

1
2

also recover for mental pain and suffering from the
date of injury.
• • •

-:.

I

3
4
5

· i (5) Medical or funeral expenses due to the
decedent's injury or death may be recovered by a
survivor who has paid them. , . , ·

6
7

(6) · The decedent's personal representative ..
may recover for the decedent's estate the following:·-·
.

...

.

1•:

..

'

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

(a) Loss of earnings of the deceased from . •
the date of injury to the date of death, less lost .
support of survivors excluding contributions in kind,,_
with interest. If the decedent's survivors include
a surviving spouse or lineal descendants, loss of
net accumulations beyond death and reduced to present
value may also be recovered.

15
16
17
18
19

_ (b) - Medical or funeral expenses due to the
decedent's injury or death that have become a charge
against his estate or that were paid by or on behalf , ·
of decedent, excluding amounts recoverable under
subsection (5).

20
21
22
23

(7) All awards for the decedent's estate are
subject to the claims of creditors who have complied
with the requirements of probate law concerning
claims ..

24
25
26

768.22 Form of verdict.-The amounts awarded
to each survivor and to the estate shall be stated
separately in the verdict.

27
28
29
30
31

768.23 Protection of minors and incompetents.The court may put in trust or provide other protection for any amount awarded for the benefit of a
minor child or an incompetent.
5

1 . . 768:24 · Death 6f l fnll'Vivor �fore Judgemtmt.:...2 A survivor's death before fmal judgm�nt Rhill limit ' ·
3 the survivor's recovery to lost support and services
4 to the date of his death. 1'he ·persorial -representative ·.
5 shall pay the amount recovered to ·the· }>el'Sonal repre�
6 sent.ative of the deceased survivor. • · ·· · -" ·, · · - , ; · ·, · : 7

768.25 · Court approval of settlements,...:.While

8 - an· action tinder this act is pending, rta settlemerrt
9 as to amount or apportionment among the beneficiaries
10 which is objected to by any survivor or 'Which affects-

11 a sumvor who is ·a minor oi an incotnpetel'tt shall be
12 · effec�ive uhless approved by th� court;·,. ;·,·.•:! 1: .:
.
.d • ! .'�
1

•, • '

; •

•' '

I

:

• ",. ,- °!')'' (}:

13
768.26 Litigation t!xpenses.-Attomeya' fees · '-;
-and
other expenses of litigation shall be paid ·by . 1
· -14
15 the personal representative and-deducted from the
16 awards to the survivors and the estate in proportion
17 to the amount awarded to them; but expenses\incurred
18: · ·for the benefit of a pamciular l\lrvivor or the
19 · estate shall be paid from their awards.• -· ·: · · ,
768.27 Effective date.-Sections 768.16 "· · - ·
20
21 through 768.27 shall take effect on January 1, 1972,
22 and shall riot apply to· deaths occlttring before that
23. date.
24
Section 2. Sections 768.01, 768.02, and -= ·· 1::'
25 768.03, Florida Statutes, are repealed when this Act
• · • · ,: ·,
26 · takes effect.

LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BUREAU SUMMARY
Amends Chapter 768, F. S., by adding Sections 768.16 through,
768.27, F. S., to be cited as "Florida Wrongful Death Act. .
Provides that when death of a person is caused by wrongful
act, including those on navigable waters, and which would have
entitled person to recover damages if death had not occuned,
person or watercraft shall be liable for damages. Provides action
shall be brought by decedent's personal representative, with
recovery for benefit of survivors and decedent's est.ate. Ac
tions for personal injuries of decedent shall abate. Damages
may be awarded for loss of support and services to each
survivor; to spouse for loss of companionship, protection, and
for mental pain and suffering; to minor children for loss of
companionship, instruction, guidance and for mental pain and
suffering; to parents for mental pain and suffering. Provides
certain limitations, protection by court of minors and in
competents, court approval of settlements where survivor ob
jects, and attorneys' fees paid out of award. Repeals Section
768.01, 768.02 and 768.03, F. S., the present basis of wrong
ful death actions. Effective date: January 1, 1972.
Similar to 1970 Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1242.

REPORT
to the

FLORIDA LAW REVISION COMMISSION
by L. S. Powers

April 22, 1971
The Executive Director of the Florida Law Revision

Commission has asked me to report on the present status
of the Commission's recommended Wrongful Death Act.

My

report follows.
The proposed act was introduced in the House of Repre
sentatives by Representative D'Alemberte and bears the desig
nation House Bill 120.

A hearing was held by the House

Judiciary Committee chaired by Representative D'Alemberte
on April 7, the second day of the current legislative session.
I was called by the Committee's staff and invited to appear,
and this was cleared with the Executive Director.

A t the

hearing, I was asked to present the bill and explain it.
Numerous questions were asked by the members of the Committee
and several suggested changes were discussed, but only one
amendment was adopted:

Section 768.23 was amended to read

as follows:
The court shall provide protection for any amount
awarded for the benefit of a minor child or an
incompetent pursuant to the Florida guardianship
law.

- 2 -

In my opinion, this amendment is of little importance.

I

preferred our original language, but there were members of
the Committee who thought that some reference to the Florida
guardianship law would improve the section.

Some lobbyists

were present at the hearing, but my recollection is that
no one spoke against the proposed act, and the bill was
reported out favorably by an unanimous vote of the Committee.
I thought Representative D'Alemberte chaired the hearing
superbly.
The proposed act was introduced in the Senate by Senator
De la Parte and bears the designation Senate Bill 323.

A

hearing was called by a Senate Judiciary Committee for April
20.

We learned of this on April 19 through the good offices

of Ernest Means, who called the Executive Director.

A call

to Representative D'Alemberte's office in Tallahassee resulted
in the Senate Committee issuing an invitation to me to be
present to testify.

Senator Barron, Chairman of the Commit

tee, called on Senator De la Parte to present the bill, which
he did.

I was invited to explain it.

Many critical questions

were asked by members of the Committee, and when the public
was invited to comment several suggestions for changes were
made by a lobbyist for the railro�ds and the insurance in
dustry.

This was followed by a series of proposed amendments

by Senator McClain, which had been reduced to writing.

My

recollection is that there were four proposed amendments
that were seriously considered by the Committee.

- 3 -

Two of the amendments were adopted.

I do not have the

exact language, because I was permitted to participate in
the discussion of them and was too busy to write them down.
I can state the substance of them, however. (Let me respect
fully suggest that you lay your copy of the Commission's
Report in front of you).

One of them is an amendment to

section 768.21(1) in lines 2, 3, 4, and 5 on page 11 of our
Report.

The effect of this amendment is to make the provision

in question mandatory rather than permissive.

The amendment

rewrites the sentence in question, but substantially the
same effect can be achieved if you will substitute "must"
for "may" in line 4 on page 11.
little or no damage.

In my opinion, this does

The other amendment that was adopted is in section
768.21(2).

The substance of this am;ndment is that a sentence

is added providing that the fact of remarriage may be intro
duced into evidence.

My research on that point indicates

that the majority rule is distinctly to the contrary and that
only one state (Wisconsin) permits remarriage to be con
sidered in arriving at damages for a surviving spouse.

The

traditional view has been that all rights are fixed as of
the date of the death, and it is possible that admitting some
later development like remarriage to be introduced might
make other subsequent developments relevant and admissible
also.

For example, I called the Committee's attention to

the fact that the addition of this language to the bill

- 4 -

might very well mean that a plaintiff would be entitled
to introduce into evidence that the remarriage was an un
happy marriage and that the widow was supporting her new
husband rather than the reverse > etc.

The Committee debated

this p roposed amendment with great vigor, and it was adopted
by a s plit vote.

In my opinion, this is a highly contro

versial change, and I am sure that there are individuals
and groups that will oppose it vigorously.

I suggested

the wisdom of introducing it as a separate bill, because it
might endanger the passage of the whole package, which is
very badly needed reform legislation. On the other hand,
this amendment does not affect the bill to the point that the
Commission's proposed reform,package is itself damaged.
Another proposed amendment would have eliminated any
recovery for mental pain and suffering by anyone whether
spouse, minor children, or parents as provided for in section
768.21.

This proposed amendment was defeated.

Another

proposed amendment would have amended section 768.19, the
basic Lord Campbell's provision.

It would have inserted the

words "in Florida" after the word "person" in line 12 on
page 10 of the Report.

It would have also added a sentence

at the end, which, to the best of my recollection, provided
that in case of the death of a citizen or resident of Florida,
an action would lie under the Florida Wrongful Death Act
even though the injury and death occurred outside of Florida.

- 5 -

As you know, the present Wrongful Death Act of Florida requires
that the death occur in Florida in order for the act to
apply.

'The Commission eliminated that requirement in its

proposal, because it would obviously cause a great deal of
difficulty where the injury occurred in Florida but the
death occurred elsewhere.

For example, the Wrongful Death

Act of the District of Columbia requires that "an injury
done or happening 11 must occur within the District of Columbia
in order for that Wrongful Death Act to apply.

If someone

were injured in Florida and went to Washington, D. C. and
there died from it, a strict construction of the two wrongful
death acts would indicate that neither one would be available
for a wrongful death action.

In this connection, it is well

to recall the strict construction often given to wrongful
death legislation because it is in derogation of the common
law.

The lobbyist expressed concern over our having eliminated

the requirement that the death occur in the State.

His

concern arose on behalf of his railroad clients because of
the possibility of forum shopping by plaintiffs' attorneys.
The proposed amendment was supported as guarding against
this danger.

I opposed the proposed amendment because of

the tremendous uncertainty of the insertion of the words
"in Florida.''

If the death was caused by a wrongful act or

negligence it would not be difficult to determine whether it
happened in Florida or not, but when does a breach of contract

- 6 -

or warranty occur in Florida?

Also, the sentence about resi-

dents or citizens of Florida being able to sue here though
the harm occurred elsewhere seemed to be supported in part
on the basis that the Florida substantive law on liability
would be applicable as well as the Wrongful Death Act itself.
I do not believe that a tortious injury and resulting death
occurring in another state or country could be the basis
for constitutionally requiring the application of Florida's
substantive law of torts.

In any event, I think both the

proposed changes in section 768.19 would create tremendous
problems of interpretation.

In my opinion, conflict of laws

issues such as this are better dealt with by the courts with
out such inflexible requirements such as this.

The proposed

amendment was defeated.
There were a couple of technical amendments unanimously
adopted in the beginning which simply corrected technical
errors appearing in the Senate version of the proposed act.
The Committee gave the bill as amended a favorable report,
and my recollection is that it was by an unanimous vote.
Obviously, the Senate Bill and House Bill now differ, a nd
there is also the possibility of further amendment in both
houses.

If the two bills are enacted, it is almost certain

that a conference committee will have to resolve the dif
ferences.

Representative D'Alemberte indicated on April 20

that he is seeking early action on the House Bill, and it
may be on the floor of the House this week.

- 7 -

I thought Senator Barron, the Chairman of the Senate
Committee, presided very ably and fairly at the Senate
hearing.•

Senator De la Parte, who is not a member of the

Senate Committee, defended the Commission's bill very ably
and energetically, speaking as the senator who introduced it.
At several points in the hearing, he most eloquently sup
ported the Commission's proposal on the basis that the in
tegrity of the package should not be damaged in any serious
way.

I am sure his vigorous opposition to further amendments

was very helpful in the defeat of some of the proposed
changes.

I did not realize that he was as interested in this

proposed legislation nor in the Florida Law Revision Com
mission as he obviously is.
presence.

I was very grateful for his

Also, I would like to acknowledge the help of

Ernest Means and a member of Representative D'Alemberte's
staff, Miss Janet Reno, both of whom assisted me in various
ways at the hearing.
I hope this report will be helpful.

If you have any

questions, do not hesitate to call or write me.

I am very

optimistic about the enactment of the proposed act.

Let

me say, however, that there is a lot more pleasure involved
in drafting legislation than there is in defending it at
hearings of legislative committees.
Respectfully submitted,
L. S. Powers
Reporter
LSP/mc
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Chnp. 6011
Sec. 8. This Act shall take effect immediatelv upon
its approval by the Governor, or. upon becoming· a law
1!115
---- without such approval.
Approved June 4, 1915.

.OHAP1'EH 6912-(No. 106).
AN ACT to Provide for the Salaries and Compensation
of the Justices of the Supreme Court, Circuit Judges,
Judges of the Criminal Courts of Record and Juage of ;
the Court
of Record iu and for Escambia Countv,
in
•
I
the State of Florida.
\.

Be It.Enacted by tlte Legislature of the St,ate of Florida:

SnlnrlPR of
Section 1. That after this Act takes effect, the sala
. 1'.11111reme
ries of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida shali
Court
,JuRtkl'R ODIi be the sum pf forty-five hundred ($4,500.00) dollars each
l'l rl'ttlt ,
Judges.
per annum, the salaries of the Circuit Judges shall be the
sum of forty-three hundred dollars ($4,300,00) per an
uum, and warrants shall be drawn by the Qomptroller in
accordance herewith.
Sa laries of
Judges of
Criminal
Courts of
Record.

Court or
ltl'cor,I of
f:1<c11mhl11
Count;t.

· Sec. 2.· That the salaries of the Judges of the Criminal
Courts of Record in counties having a population of fif•
teen thousand or less shall be one thousand ($1,000.00)
c}ollar!' per annum; in counties of less than twenty-five
tl1oustmd population and over fifteen thousand popula
tion, the salaries shall be fifteen hundred ($1,500.00) dol
lars per annum; in counties having a population of more
than twenty-five thousand and less than sixty thousand, ;
the salaries shall be one thousand eight hundred dol
lars ($1,800.00) per annum, and in all counties having a
population of ovet· sixt�- thousand, the salaries shall be·
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) per an•:
num.
Sec. 3. Th*t the salary of the Judge of the Court of
Record in and for Escambia County shall be the sum ol �
three thousand· five hundred dollars (33,500.00) per an•
num, which said Judge shall not engage in the practir.l!.
of law during his torm of office, nor in anywise exercise

\'.'.:
:,,,.... ),,,(:'�
,-,,. ' ./ -·':::,. 253 '
12,
\ the ,profession or accept compensation as an attor�ey
counselor.
- . : · ; ,. 1915
Snlnry
Sec. 4. The salaries provided for in this Act shall con-· conetltutee
stitute the entire compensation, and allowances of any econtire
sation.
and every nature, and shall be paid as now provided bv mpen
· la�, _except that each Circuit Judge when traveling on
:··
of �1 c 1al business beyo n_d the C irc�it for which he was ap- . ' ;
p 0 1nted, sha 11be, an d 1s hereby given an allowance to the
amount of his actual expenses for transportation board
. and lodging, and such amount forthwith 'after �aid of- : · , • : ficial trip shall terminate to be set forth in an itemiz�
certificate by.the Circuit Jud�e to the Comptroller.·,
LAWS OF FLORIDA.

::·ri�
t

Rer. 5. All lawR and parts of laws in conflict with the . - : :
- provisions of this Act shall be, and the same are, berebv
repealed.
Sec. 6. _This Act shall take effect from the time 1t be_comes a law.
Approved May 29, 1915.

CHAPTER 6913-(No. 107).
to Amend Section 3145, General Statutes of
,. the State of Florida, R!!Iating to Claims for Death
Caused by Negligence.
· Be ft Enacted by tlte Legislature of tlte State of Florida:
' f:ection 1. That Section 3145, General Statutes of the
State of Florida be and the same is hereby amended so
as to read as follows:

lal m
. 'Whenever the death of any person
in this State shall dCea
th cnus
.
be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or b;r ne1111ence.
defnnlt of an;v individual or individuals, or by the wrong· . , : .'/ ·. ; :
fol a�t, negligence, carelessness, or default, of any cor• , . ;: · · ·
porahon, or b_y the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, , · l ., ·
_or de�ault, of any agent of any corporation, acting.in his · ;''
'8pac1ty of agent of such corporation ( or by the wrong ;. ,
ful act, negligence, carelessness, or default of any ship,
Jessel or boat or persons employed thereon), and the

254
,.......,.___
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Chap. �13

' t

act, negligence, carelessness, or default, is such as would,
if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party in
jured thereby to maintain an action (or to proceed iu
rem against the said ship, vessel or boat, or in personam
against the owners thereof, or those having control of
her) and to recover damages in respect thereof, then and
in every such case the person or ,persons who, or the
corporation ( or the ship, vessel or boat), which would
have been liable in damages if death had not ensued,shall
be liable to an act!on for damages ( or if a ship, vessel or
boat to a libel in rem, and her owners or those responsi
ble for her wrongful, act, negligence, carelessness, or de
fault, to a libel in personam), notwithstanding the death
of the persQn injured, and although the death shall have
, been caused under such circumstances as amount in Jaw
to a felony.
Sec. 2. This Act shall take effect immediately upon
its approval by the Governor.
. Approved May 28, 1915.

CHAT'TEH 6!ll4-(No. 108).

AN ACT Making Anr Person, Firm or Corporatio n
Liable, on Demand. in Current Money of the United
States, to Any Legal Holder Thereof, for the Fuil Face
Value of Any Checks, Coupons, Punch-outs, Tickets.
Tokens or Other Device Iss11ed by Them in Payment
for Labor, and Redeemable Either Wholly or Partially
in Merchandise at Their or Any Other Place of Bu�i
ness, and Fixing "the Time After Which Said Checks,
Coupons, Punch-outs, Tickets, Tokens or Other Device
Shall Become Redeemable in Cash, and Providing for
the Enforcement of This Act.

Be It Enacted, by the Legislatttre of the Stafe of Florida:
'
That any person, firm or corporation is• '
• . Section 1.
Whrn
tickets, tokens or ,
pay check s
checks,
suing
, coupon�, punch-outs,
•
rNleemab 1 e I n
l 1ther;
d
labor
for
payment
1D
dence
other
t re eemab e e
1•
mone

L'2:,. , ' • l

A
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wholly ot pa,tia;�Y :::. :::::�di•� .: �::}
any othe1· place of business, shall, on demand of any legal
holder thereof, on or after the ninetieth day succeeding
the day of issuance, be liable for the full face value there- ·
of in .current money of the United States.

.

'
·

!

·

1915

1
. Sec. 2. That' any such checks, punch-outs, coupons,' !'..!�!� et�n
hckets, tokens or other device, issued by any pe rson · bearer not•
fit-m or corporation in payment for labor shall be consil :'J�i:ii1f�!.g ·.
ered and treated as payable to bearer in current monev
.. .
of the United States, notwithstanding any contrary stipulation or provision which may be therein contained.. :
· · ' .. - •
Sutt to
Sec. 3. That ln case of failure of any person' firm or . recov
er after
co1pora
t'ion to pay any I egal holder of any such check, ntneUeth
•
day.
.
punch-out, ticket, coupon, token or other device issued
by them in payment for labor, the full face value thereof ·
in current money of the United States ' on or after the
nmeheth day succeeding the da,r of issuance, when so
den�anded, such holder may immediately bring suit thereon m any court of competent juriRdiction and in addi
tion to recovering the full face value ther�of ;ith legal
interest from demand, may recover ten per �ent of said
amount as attorney's fees in the same suit.
. \
•

l

Sec. 4. All Jaws and parts of laws in conflict herewith
are hereby repealed.
.
,
Rec. 5. This Act �hall take effect immediately upon its
JlRRsage and approval by the Governor.
Approved June 5, 1915.

CHAPTER 6915-(No. 109).

AN ACT RelatiYe to the Care, Maintenance and Hiring
of State ConYicts and Making an Appropriation for
•• •.,
Carrying Out the Provisions Thereof.
n

"1

.

rj

- •

-:�. --;,-�-'{

Be It Enacted. by the Lcgislatm·e of the State.of Florida,:

. Section 1.' On or before the first day of Aug�st 1915
. the State Prison Phys�cians shall examine and gr�de ali
- the State convicts and shall dh-ide the said convicts into'

•

Stnte

co vtctR to be

n
Into
graded

three claBBe11.
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of Commissioners of State Institutions. At the end of each biennium
all sums in excess of $250,000.00 in said fuhd, as determined by
the state auditor, shall;revert to the general revenue fund.

been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a
felony.

CHAPTER 28280

Section 2.

This act shall take effect July 1, 1953.

Became a law without the Governor's approval.
Filed in Office Secretary of State June 15, 1953.

(2) The right of action as set forth in subsection (1) above
shall extend to and include actions ex contractu and ex delicto.
Became a law without the Governor's approval.
Filed in Office Secretary of State June 15, 1953.

CHAPTER 28280

CHAPTER 28281

SENATE BILL NO. 363
AN ACT amending Section 768.01, Florida Statutes, relating to
right of action for death due to wrongful act, negligence, care
lessness or default based on both contract and tort.

Be It E�acted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1.
768.01

Section 768.01, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

Right of action for death.-

CHAPTER 28281

SENATE BILL NO. 359
AN ACT amending Section 40.02 (1), Florida Statutes, relating to
the number of persons for the selection of jury lists.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:

Section 1.
read:
40.02

Section 40.02 (1), Florida Statutes, is amended to

Selection of jury lists by county commissioners.-

(1) Whenever the death of any person in this state shall be
caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of
any individual or individuals, or by the wrongful act, negligence,
carelessness or default of any corporation, or · by the wrongful
act, negligence, carelessness, or default, of any agent of any cor
poration, acting in his capacity of agent of such corporation (or
by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any ship,
vessel or boat or persons employed thereon), and the act, negli
gence, carelessness or default, is such as would, if the death had
not ensued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain
an action (or to proceed in rem against the said ship, vessel or
boat, or in personam against the owners thereof, or those having
control of her) and to recover damages in respect thereof, then
and in every such case the person or persons who, or the cor
poration (or the ship, vessel or boat), which would have been
liable in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action
for damages (or if a ship, vessel or boat, to a libel in rem, and her
owners or those responsible for her wrongful act, negligence, care
lessness or default, to a libel in personam), notwithstanding the
death of the person injured, and although the death shall have

(1) SELECTION OF LISTS, GENERALLY.-In all counties,
except those having a jury commission, the county commissioners
shall hold' a meeting during the first week in January of each
year, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and at such other times
as the circuit judge may order, for the purpose of selecting jury
lists. At such meeting said commissioners shall personally select,
from the lists of persons who are qualified to serve as jurors under
the provisions of §40.01, and make out a list of, ,not less than two
hundred fifty (250) nor more than fifteen hundred (1,500) persons
properly qualified to serve as jurors, which list shall be signed
and verified by said commissioners as having been personally
selected as aforesaid and as possessing the prescribed qualifications
according to their best information and belief. Said list shall be
forthwith delivered to the clerk of the circuit court and by him
r_ecorded in the minute book of the board of county commissioners.

934
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Became· a law without the Governor's approval.
Filed in Office Secretary of State June 15, 1953.
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FLORIDA }IOUSE OF }1EPRESENTATIVE£.
TALLAHASSEE
TALBOT

"SANDY" D'ALEMBERTE
REFri:ESENTATVE. 96�;; DISTRICT
ROOJr.t 2.03, CA?JTOL
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32300:

March 8, 1972

J. B. Spence, Esquire
Suite 801, City National Bank Building
Mia�i, �lorida 33130
Dear J.B.:
Thank you for your letter of March 1st. The
Wrongful Death Bill passed the legislature with the
arnendmen� which you find objectionable. It was our
feeling that even with this amendment the bill was
much preferab2.e to the existing situation.
Sincerely,

TD'A:njd

'•
COMMITTEES·
JUDICIARY, CHA.tRMAN
'
APPROPRIATIONS
RULES & CALENDAR
f'INA.NC:E & TAXATION

LAW OFFICES

SPENCE, PAYNE & MASINGTON, P. A.
SUITE BOI-CITY NATIONAL E!IANK BUILDING

MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130
.J B SPENCE
R W PAYNE,.JR
RICHARD S MASINGTON

25 WE:ST FLAGLER STRE:E:T
TE:LE:PHONE: 377-0641
AREA CODE: 305

March 1, 1972

Honorable Talbot D 1 Alemberte
House of Representatives
Tallahassee, Florida
Dear Sandy:
I am involved in a case which is going to be presented to the
Supreme Court shortly, dealing with damages under the Wrongful
Death Statute. The question certified to the Supreme Court is
whether or not the Defendant may refer to the fact that the Plaintiff
has remarried.
I am enclosing for your information a copy of the brief which
refuses all of the Florida decisions that deal with the subject. On
page five of the brief recites all of the jurisdictions who have ruled
on the matter nationwide. Sandy, please note the comments on
page seven of this brief. The reason I am bringing this to your
attention is that I understand that the Wrongful Death Statute has
been amended by the Senate to provide that evidence of remarriage
may be introduced to reduce the Plaintiff 1 s damages.
I think such an amendment is a "gutting" tactic, pure and simple
and I hope that you will fight against such an amendment to your bill.
I really appreciate all of your help and effort.

1
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'?:'!:.is c-:n·tio::.-:":\:ri ;,:roc�adln?. lo b�,fo'l!':, the court on :.. petillon flled
-,·u:.-�ua:.1� !:-:>

f.!.

-::c,;:.•ti1fo:ita o1 t:'.113 Dlat:dct c�-,i.u.·-: oi A ppe;.l, .:.•m:1rth Dial:ric�,

c.:,:;.:u::!:..di:.-:q tb:J.t t;,, cb�bbn b 5a3�>oiii�d Coaatlln� r>.;.,alroatl Gom?a11y v. !·H.11,
.'!'.h ...\]-:_J. 1')71, 25:J Sp. 2d 311, p�:':.l:'l;?d \.\:,on� qu;:.::.;tlon of g:1,at ptiblle !ntal'eat.
��·:1_1

,y1.-";:,i:d.•;m c·�::C"Htl-3d b fi� ophllon �i::id CrJ!"�i:J.;:;:ite isi
n-,:::v:,1:h-:,:r c:.- �ot h'l .:,. -.·/:'"02tJ:?ul dea:!:h :.\cdon
u.':l.,:le'.'l' �.foc':ion 768 .. 02. :!:'.
196·1, b1·ou�:tit
b7 ::,;'}.::, :J?uu:a;;i, t•t.> colL,ct dama3as :OG3ul�ln�
fror.\ c:·13 ,;�ongful deatil of ta� other D:p0U39 ,,
oviden-.;:3 ol z',lainHf:• n -:: �-ma::-ria3e is a.dmiaaible
t-o :::11tl3ah1 damagas."

s.

B::-leily summ.ari:Jed, n wron6f-.il death a�tion by th9 survi•l'ing wife of
t:i.a d�c,aasetl was b:roupt against the peti'Uoner railroad.
plainU.!f re3ultt,d.

Du:rb.g th.0 trbl, the cuu.:.-t ruled

A verdict fo-r the

wt p:roof of r�mardagc:-

of the plaintiff �a not adrnl1uihle to mitigate damages or for any other purpose;
.).!'ld t=iat the def�ndant e:.>uld not allude to the fact of remarriage or argue it.
Tha FoUl'tn Dlatl'ict afiirmed the J�dgme.nt for the plalntlff, thoroughly
.d iscus.sing the it95ue (250 So. 2d 346-318).
'l'hs d-?.f�ndant-petltioner now chall0n3es the TUliag on Hre-.marriage"
hi t::1i!J court.
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OUESTION P��SENTZD
T!l-a qua:,tlon ce:-tifh.,d siquar(!tly ataba th.a i9;;iuei
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'.; !-LSTH:I:It o:a NOT IN 1-\ Wl1.0NGi"UL
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19b9. J1R0UGHT 31"' 01-1.S .SPOUSZ 1'0
CCLL.t::CT DA:...tAC.BS RE3U!..TL.'\JG Fl"{OM
TB:: ',',':RONG:;;'Ul, D:SA'l'H OF n-n; OTHER
�;?()tJ3.?:, =1lID��-iC.E or.:- Pk\U'lT!FF'S
";::::::L\Rl1.L\G:S IS ADMl3SlSLZ '1'0 !'-.1!.TlG-'\T.E
Ill

;\} F!lO:-tIDi\ DEClSIONS 1\CTUALLY HAVE
Al'!3WERBD QUESTION !..� NEGATIVZ IN
./\CCOaDANCE Vl!TH O"VZR \¥1-IELML"lG
VfE!.GHT OF A. U'I'HORITY

t:iroughout Florida. Actually,. howevttr, the i•st.te abeady has been passed upon
directly on prior occaaion• 'by the Thil'd Dlat�ict, ud tho•e dechlona,, like
the decb\on of th• Fourth District here. are 1n total accordance with the
.
1

OVE,X I

•.Yh3l....'"'Xlll1g weight of authority on the point. In To"N:ll of 11,Uami S1:>:rinq11 v. Bo�:-eca, i
Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 519 cert.den., 114 So,.Zd 4, a plaintlff-widow i;ought
damages for th.a �Ol'lgful dnth of her huaband.

The plain.till remarl'ie<l prior

to ar.aend the style oi the cause to reflect her new married came. The coun
tha::3, aa iut:re, excluded evidence or inUma.tlon, or argwne11t o! eou.nsel of the
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tl1a d>2!fand;,u,t c.:hall:a.ng�<l the i·t.,·mard3.1e r1.uin:J. Th• Thh'd

Dbt:-L::t Couri of A:.,pa.\l r,.iflrm!i!-0 th-:, ju.d�mar1t 11 ?9'2' cu:d. .lm" (110 3o. 2d 519).
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'i,, • • •:-::.21 ·,::,::d 1 ·1i't:.=.m�d 1 so U:rie<l Z'l$
f.'.:-"!5JfJ:,n·ily r.n�a:).:, :?.:i.;;tt t::u� a·'."?iJU;;}.te �;>urt
;n':i r.::-�r,�f:.uly (��tlmi!.\�d �11 ;?-Oi:1-:a
1·:i.b::;:d b7 oll r!.�.:llbJ pa1·ti":1 m.1.d
found i!'lem to b-, ".riithout m-ari:�. n (S�8
;) l ;;o. .!,�n1I'd., •••. ',,
, . ,i,av�::- ....,:n;i
• �
� 3:,. .i..."le..
..
-..,.1.;:1.
��,•s
.L 7t:> , 1·:11
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,.:>O
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'I.."'.l !·➔ ·-'-wmoru v.. L:1'!.te Worlh D:taitia'le Obt:ie�L E'l:.. 195b. '37 So. 2:d
4-S-, 50, thio court aald,
"Sucii ::tn O")i?ion cal"-ries no lesa w�iuh.t: biaca'llaf!l
oi □ -ii ��m½lnehtu:re that deaignat,oa U as such.
32 '?/;):rda and ?hrar.e:JJ. ?t9r Curi.un; Black's Law
Dletlonal"'f, ?vlino:r v. Flke, 77 Kan. 800, 93 P 264i
Cu:-ke v. Vltut.er:!1 .l\sttu'?'. Co•• 146 Pa. 561, 23 1'\. 248,
15 L.U ••A. 127 • ,. ."
l

L"1 F. z. C. v. ?.iallen, Fla. J\pp. 1966, 133 So. 2d 5"l7, a verdict and judgm..m
of $86, 000 w:u upheld on appeal to �• Tbl::d Plot:rh::t over a def�ru1s claim
oi Ol":?O!" i::i e::r.zlu3ion of :remar=riage r�f�l"encei3. The t:-ial court ruled that
t:i.,a plai:1Hif would be designated "?vi:-a. Keilan1t claspi!e h3r :rema�rbg� to
tl rn.;\ti of an,othel" name. Th9 Third Dbtrid Coun of Appeal had no d1Hh:ulty
b'l � f.:1 :_-mb g.
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r;1a 'I'hlrd �nd Fourtl-1 Dl:Jtrie! d.:--,dsioas foll�w a li:nasa of .Florida
.3�1iliol"!:i,it::t ...-mich e$t:tl>li:i!l iz-:.a colla·te:riJ.l .:,oul'ce ::'23.a in anala�oua aUu:irtlonsi
,..,�1n1�'!..
;;..a V.

�-h<.:i ,en_J... :.!
.1.a. 1c•�.t.
, ::>o• 87 So. 2d 42; ?r�::i..s'l" v. Ewell En.g1:i.aerb3 b
,-.·,... �,..,d
'!":'"1

Cl>nh·actli13 Co., (Fla. 1952), 62 5(),. 2d 51; Wad,nvorth v. Friend,

n�. .App.

1967, 201 So. 2.d 641; O'Neill v. Rnv1 Fl:i."\pp.1 ()68, 213 So. Zd l; ?sr.ull• v.
Thoma11.,

na . .App. 1963,

150 So. 2d -'l57i G:r-1:vhound Coro. v. l-to:rdt Fla.App.

1963, 157 So. :?d 427.
The Florid11 faw, bot..¾. i:i this pr<aclae oituailon, and ln cloaely a.Aalagotut
11

co1lateral oourc:e n sltuation:J, obvlo\uily euppol'ts "the ded11ion below.
D) OVER rn-IZL!vili'l'G Yf E!GHT 07 R$ASON.:SD
.AUTHORITY SU?PORTS D.EC!.S!ON BELOW
Th·a exclu3i.on of evidence of rema-r-rla3e, or refe-rence thel"eto, e,g

-::'::-li;:th'i he expect�,. is not a new, novel, or u..--u-qua l"Ullng. To the cont:-a:ry,
t.b.�l'� is � plethora oi case3 on t::ie point, · which···: o�,erwhelmingly establbh,
i:1 n-i:cord3:lc-, with logic and common ae:aae, that pl'oo! of, or rof<t:rance to
-r�1-ma:-ria:J<-' is irr�levant, unjuatifiad, c:alcw:.ied only to prejudice, �nd la agabst
L,•\'.'✓ (J-:'\:1c1..:.:.:., !--1 0r)H�Jf'{��f
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· • c • v· a. 1"17!> 9 ,
172 :t. Supp. � )05 (�ea;h on tb.e High s�aa llct); The Citsf of ls.om.a
{1930, DC NY) 43 �--. 2d 333; Petition of �roted Stal:es (1950, DC NY)
?2 ?. Supp. 495; Urut.ed States v. Th� W�11hinston (1959, DC Va}
17Z F. s,..1P!). 905, tlf.f1 d on op below Unil;�d StateiJ v. Tex:u Co..
(CA4) 272 F. 2d '111: 3lumGthal v. United State• (1960 ,, DC Pa)

139 F. Su�p. 43�

.A:-bona ... -Hing v. Youtsey, A:-b. 1969, 460 P. 2d 646
.A::!t,uu1as. --St. Louti I. M. &«S. n.. C.o. v. Cl.ae:re (1903) 76 A:-k 377..
D3 S� VI. 993
CalUoni.i.:a.--Barth v. B.F. Gootlt"lcli Tire, Co •• Cal.App.1968, 71 Cal.
�r,tr. 30b; Ile..nw�ll ...�. D..e:an, 249 Cal••1\-pp. Zd 345; 57 Cal, Hptr. 394
;:>'Elhwa.re .... -ne�hh v. Willis, Del. Suj>,, • 209 A. 2d 760
D.C.--C:ol�t:r.i.a.:l v. :t\':oo:-e,

D.c.

D!.1952, 103 S".Su;_?.425
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L1diana. - -Con301i:.bt..3d Slone Co. v. M:o:r�an (\ 903) 160 Ind 241. 66 NE
69S: ','.; /!)':uh R. C-.,. v. Gaetzi.nJe:r (} ?14) 182 ind 155, 104 NE 69:
C"intr-al Indiana R. Co. v ••�uda:raon .Can!dng Co., Ind.1968, 240 NE.2d
�.:10 [:1ctu31l7 d�cicl�d u.-,d�r Jfed'!tral :C�::nployer':, Liability .Act}

:.'..,,:>Hbiana. --'1'�i�1'~}1::bnd v. :UUnob C. R. ,. Co. {!961) 241 La 15, 127 So .. 2.d
L:l3; :�tf'!pnens v. 1\iat.:::hitochas Pa:rL1h School Boal"d {1959, LaAp?)
·!tr:, So. 2d 15:6, :-;:,vd o�, othttr ,c;!"•:)UnJ15 23J La J8a" 115 S,:, .. :-!d 793;
:3t·"p�uma v. l'-fat:::i.itocli-"'a ?a1'bh 3chool Board (1962, L.a App) 137 Sn. 2d
116. Sa�, howev�::, 0 1 Cc�'lno:r T.•. Chic:1qo, ?.!. a: P.::t.Co .. {19.;9,
La -::, ?:')
:5o. 2d 663

,rn

!-,iichi�an.--Bunda v. Hardwii:k, 376 r..-Hca.640, 133 N. Vl.2d 305
(l 965} f ove:rrulin� p:d.o:r .Mkh. dechionJ
Minnesota. --M�rphy v. Barlow Realty Co., 214 Minn. 64. 7 N. W. 2d 634
Mlsaouri. --Davis v. 5?:ringfield Hospital (1920} 204 l,,,lo App 620, 218
svr 696; Platt v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co. (192'), Mo -�pp) 12 SW. 2d
933
Nebraska. ---Chicago, St .. P. M. &: O. R. Co. v. Lagerkrane (1902)
65 N�b 56<>, 91 NW 358, 95 NW 2.
New Yo?'k. --Lees v. New York Con11ol. R. Co. (1919) 109 Misc 608 ,.
180 NYS 546
Ohio. --Davis v. Guarnieri (1887) 45 Ohio St. •'70, 15 NE 350. 4 Am St
Rep 548
Oregom --Prausa v. At:bmskl (19S2) 195 Or l, 244 P. 2d 598; Raymond
v. So. Pac. R. Co. 1971, 488 P. 2d 460
Penns7lv�nia. --Philpott v. Penn�ylnbia R. Co. (1396) 175 Pa 570,
34 .A 856
Rnode Island. -- Weisel v. Cicerone, R.I. 1970, 261 A. 2d 889

s.

Te:xa�. --Gulf, C. &
F. ll. Co. v. Younger (1897) 90 Tex 38i, 38
SW 1121: Intel'nlltior.ur.1 & G. N. R. Co. v. Boykin (1905 ,. Tex Civ App)
85 SW 1163, revd on other ground• 99 Te::x 259. 89 SW 639; Texaa E. R.
Co. v. Stewart (1919, Tex Clv App} 85 SW 1081. er:-or ref; Gulf,
C, &. S. F. R. Co. v. Moser (1925, Tex Civ A pp) Z27 SW 722 11 :rl)vd
on other ground• 275 US 133, 7Z L ed 200, 48 S Ct 49. See, however,
Dixie Motor Coach Col'p. v. Shiveret (1939, Tex Civ .App) 131 SW. 2d
677, erTor dlsmd. : ,
LAW OfFlCES. POOHUflST, OP.:li::CK .l PARKS, P.A.��COUN5EL, WALT!':R H
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Virr,!inia •• -See S"'abou·d Jl,ir Line R .. Co. �.T. Conno:r (1938, C.A 4 Va}
Z-61 .1.!-.. 2.d 65f>
VI o-;.t Vlr 6inla. --Dimmey v. Wbe�Hn:� ?..t E.G.::?.. Co. {1385} 27 VI Va
32, 55 f., P.e-p 292

s:ia<:otullin. --J�ns-,,n v. r-Je:rita�.a Mutual In�. Co.• Vih�. !964.
1 �7 .N. ·,,i. 2d /23 [ :_, ,c,lying on r:.UchlJa.a �utho.ri.ry fl;!)eci.iic:ally ovo:t-rul,ad
in ;Jund�.).

P"'� ct!l.:J�a .ind r°!LH:u��itm on i99ue 37 A. L.n. 2d 252-263 :itnd fa·hsr caau
$�?,11 C'8)

h the r.,...asonin� behbd it.

The f.ollowi."'1g reasoni, time and again aet iorth

! ) Marriage h a personal rebtlonshi1> and da:na1es a:r� allowt,d for

loss of a specific opouse--of the widow's own choice.

�..1blic policy £0:-blds the

fiction that tiie t'emarriago replaces the decea11ed husband.

Public policy

forbids speculation on comparl!ltlve values and vi.rt:1ias of the deceased hu,iiband ,.

and even tna
li\ttempt to tlo so.
�L

C ompar i aonil b etween "'-e
• · h'lP•\I
.;.;..1a cou.u,ort,
eompan.1&hs

protection. m�l'lb\l relation.a and :iJu:pport of wife and �hildren nfforded by the

new hu,band anrl that afforded by the deu::ea!U!d are unthinkabh,, speculatiV9 and
a.1ahut public pcUc-y..

bdeed, the underly-inf( thlnking ln the defeiue position �eema to be

that a d-eceased child co,tld b� replaced slrn.::,1; by the offer ol" tander of anot.ho:r
Com-pa:rhons of merits of re1t1pective husbands are &-aught with mischief.

Should the subs!!:tquent conjugal ventui-e prov-e happier and more beneflcial, it is
-7-
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atte:rnpta would lead to utttc1r- confualon. ilnd thia pr<!tjudk• \V'OW.d £�r outw�igh any

relevance 1.nvolve<l in th.s raierenci'il to the ?laintlt.f' a pr•»ent ruune. that l"elevance
l
fa more than over-balanced by the intenoely prejudkial effects of a jury• s knowln�
tbat a plaintiff :::io longer baa her d�ceaaed huaband•• mime.
Our Supreme Court baa recognb•d that evid4'nce which baa only sl13ht
relevance and lntense pl'ejudlce o'hoold be excluclec.i.,

in Pe:rner v. Ede11 1

nwe conceive the rule to be that. H the. introduction
ci th� evlde.."\c..t t'lnda in a.ctw o:90ration to produce
a con!uaion in the minds of the jul"oi-, in exce.ta of
the legHl::r.a.t'6 pTobative effect ot such evidtmce-if lt t•nd.2 to 009cure rathei- than illuminate the
tn1e l3$Ue before the jury--then au.ch evidence
should be excluded. Wigmor•a on Evidence. Tbh·d
Edi�io:a .. Section 904; 31 C. j. 3., Evidence, § l 59. pag:a
869; .Atlantic: Coaet Line R. Co. v. Campbell. l04 Fla.
274; 139 So. 386; McCaffrtf9'1 v. Scbw:srt�, 2.85 Pa.
561, 132 A. 810; Golden Reward Mui. Co. v. Bwcton
?\Un. Co., 8 Ch•.• 97 F. "113: Vear v,. Hagemann, 334
111. 2.l, 165 N. E. 175; Bie»car v. St. Loula Public
Service �o., Mo. App. 160
2d 780. 11

s. w.
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.JR

"• •• it ilil fol' c>:rdinary minds, and not for :p.iiycho
:�:1aly:1ts, :..�.i.t oul' rules �i 1')Vt.denc• �re i':r.ami,itJ.
·.vhen the riak oi coniu3ion is so rrre�t as to upset
foe b:ab.nce of advanta�e, th-, evide.uce ehould be
e,cch1ded ., Shf!�i-d v. Unit:P.!d Sh.t"!la, 2-90 U.S. 96,
54 S. Ct. 22 11 7 a L. E.:l. 196.
H ls 0:.1::- co:-:iciu:.1ion th.at 66:t ,.�vhhntc'!'l of th0 -phy:si
r.:i:ln'.3 ==-·�bib� to .::==d�lP 3 m.er,tal inc:1yadty ahou\d
h:3.v:, b��l �):::tc1':.1d"'<l, 3.':l t�n<lin� to confuae and mi::,
lc;td ::h� jury far beyond a:ny ?l"Ohative v;,lu-d which
rmch tt��l:im-:,oy h3tl. i-�'l ndr:,.i�Jion into -;;lVidence
W33 t:a.::-4fO:!"..-!· Ol":'◊l", and lt w,�il n-.>t harmles:3 el"?'Ol' o
•

0

•

2) Th'fl w:.-on.Jiul a,::t of deiendant fr�cuently placea the widow a:1d children
i!l

:1

poiltlo.n ,. flnandal and otherwis�, which. wi,uld carry with it a compellin..�

!"na.Joo fo:r remal'riag� ;.1.nd ::::U!J would cai'ry with it in�uiry at trial into �"!asons
fo-r- th.e remarria6e. ontl thereby would tend to dote:riorate the l"elatloruahip

3} Thi} law favors mal"riage and a contrary rule would ofte!'l.. compel
atto-rn.eyts to �dvbe clients� to remarry.

In a Wl."ongful death case the damage'I

al'� establlsh-ed immediately. bu.t ordinarily a �onaidera.ble period of ti.me elapaaa
bP-twe�o the d�ath and the t!"ial.

During that time. the law does not recognise

a rula which would discour:ige remarrLal•• and r11utraln it and caet th� ,vidow' s
burden and that oi her chlldr$n upon society and fri•nda.
4) The deiieruia.nt» w:-onglul act ought not to !oreie a woman to render an
u.mavor;,.bl� comparlaon betwee!l bier pre.tent hu111band and the one �'u, defendant
l'd.lled.

H: would be only natur:J.1 that a widow would not wbb to explain the

f;.1].l i:ropact of h,i,r los•, if ouch explanation depended upon her making public
and tuuavorable comparleon with her present husband.
L ".\V Ot�tC 1

:,.;,
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5) ;;peculation •;�,ould run rr.unpc1.rt ;">n �i'lorhl to p::rovs ., for example 1
c;;,u\c..Jt, of ;;.6.:,.ma?rb.ge, tha ty� of p�i:�ntbl :;:nate� or com::,al"lssons hetw��Yi the
�.s,w 9�ou9� with ':h� old..

L"leuh-y would b1:1 h3d, n�aln�t 3111 common a�nae �o�ceptr,:

,>Z t.1'-:�cclm:y :-1nd ,-,:d. .racy, rmJ ".'.lU�Hc :10H:;:y \<.hi.i!h favo:r.� t!"T<-, :-:nA:rital :rela.tioM,hi?. into
1..:1. .� ,:.�a 1��u of :1�r �):r".:!.•.,,ni Ln:u·Hal l'el:J.tiona, coxrdo:rt, curnp�lo�:.hi-p,. u11<l 't)2"0t"!letic� •
. \U o: th:a bdrnab� d;;,1:!¼11..i r.-;i h�.r µ:r�a�nt

!n;;\:':!'L,1�ft

·::i.roulil

o;:, o:x;olo::,"!d.

Th�

·. -1:rl{F"f �-:,�n •.;,.,ro�1d h-, corn,,,an�d to ;:;,:)mf,.;n-� b�tw..,,iezi. hu3ba�d:a.
�-·... o:.-i ::.ia,
-�
. ·i.:;-t:n'.-'.1�:."lee '.l..'H:n
"
•
',.. vtr'.':,1':\1
• · � ...� y : ·�ver1 ..-\m�':u:.:,n
-1
' �• • •
c ) -�
u1
.,u:rr.ssc1enon,
r_

:: ,:Di:.,t �l'tl:r ha:; :uld t:.i,t ,,. to:.--ti-aua 1M:'Ol'q--::l.t>�l" �hould �et uo he.n�Ht from
:..dv:,u1tag�:1 :.)!fo:rd�d to hl3 vktim frorn o!:h..,r or collat�l'al �ourcea� which.
'i,!::!neti!a t'he tlaf�nda.llt in .::\O wha .fu:-niah"d•

Dam31Je3 ior wrongful d-aath �ra

�.·u�d upon loiu c:alcubt� �i the time of di!!al:h.

SttbH1-queat eventa al'e

iznmaterbl n:nd the collatiesral sou:::-ce rule hohb tna.t2
"• o • Total or ?arthtl eoropensaHe21 for
a.n injury !"�ceived by the inju.red p-::trty
trom. a.::x:ollatcral source wholly indepen
cient of the wron.�-do�r 1avUl not ope J<ate
to lea•en th� damages recov1'rable from
fo9 perso!l causL.-,,g the injury. 11 Paradis
v. 7'homa>, aupl"a.

7)

n emarri:age ai!ordt no re11l p:rotecti.on to the plain.ti.ff wife nnd

:.:lOAt! .ilt all to t.he minor childretn.

Under our stat1J.te and ma.fly otha!'lll 6 the

:,u:viving wife brings the o.ctioll in her own n�:tle.
"'.;:.1it

Th!!! ehlldr-en arc not �l"ties.

doa."l collect i!flll.3 oi damaies which !.nure to th& hen-et.flt of trul cliildren.

:-n1cli aa loa.1 of iuhlr8 � .. tah, ,, lo�s oi aervice3 in taking car& of the f.mily. :1nc.i
losi, o.f !ilUp!)O::rt fol' m�or d1ildre.n.

On t:'1� oth�,-r ha;od, ·�.ha new huabaDd legally owea no duty

5-o ,3o. 2d 509 ,, ! 952 ..
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,�n foe c;'lildren to S>J.p!)ort th.em or othar�Nise prov!iJ� for foeil' well-being.
Tfl.� ci.iUdrl"li'l h;iav� no ;.-i'(Zlt to Ma e!!ltat._, :uu:i .no '!t"lght oi �uppol"t i'l"Om the �econd
lmaband.

b m.lny

C3,,&!H

tha ne(:cnd hu:iihand will already hnv� children of bis

·'.;)'� when he znarrhta the wi<lo·N and it i;:1

:1

very lik.tly -:,¢:nibllity th.:t bi3 e3tah,.,

H llny • will r;o to M.i.l own chil6l"!!!n :•ai:her th.an the child:-�n �.f 1'\h ��cond v,Ue.
A-d�i�ionally, th� cbil.i:r�n -;:vould have no :riiht to cnUd �upport in t...'iit event
t..h:...t ilia -;;;ltlow and 3ecuntl !luilband ·.ve:re <l!.-r:,::-cad.
SL'l,;,e th� w:ro.a51ul

".lCt

oi th� f]s(!!f·antl.lln, o.n:3n ?lace:, i.:!.l� wirluw 3:.ad children

h1 :1uch ?OYerry ::hat :Jhe ha:J :-..o choic\$ bu.i: to r�m..'1:-Ty ;,-rorr:_:>tly a!3 it d!.d i!1 d1b
cafi.a, ,�.., po!iiiil�Ui�y of aev�rance of the a�co:ui m:a.l":-12�� b v"!ry r,,a-1.

!� !;1

ti.nder:,tantlable that a woman !.!1 auc:h oituation may m.�ke a choice of a marit�l
pal"tner whlch works out v�r, unhappily• or ev1,n re:uuts i.."'2. dlvol"ea.
u
3} The "perjury argument with :refer-e.nce to .:alli.ng t.b..;, ·""idow by her

i

prior trul�rled name at trial is ludlcrou.s.
permitted only by a rula of law.

The use of the :;,rior ruame would be

The only poa.aU>l• :reason .for inqu.lry int-o the

present name la to show rem�rlage. lml)roperly. ior pr$judlc1.al irrelevant
reasons.
1.\1 fah-nea• to all, and in accordance with well-established principles
proof of :r.-emarrlage, or mention o:r sugge1tion of it, iJhoultl be excluded.
Sin<::e th� fact of remarria�e cannot pro?t.u:ly be conaidered. by t!1.a
jlll")'• r�ference to that fact in the course of the trlal could have only the most
pl"ejudicial efiec:t in the consideration o! the damages to which
titD.Utl.ad.
0

the plaintiff b

Such reference would permit the jury improperly to -reduce or

mitlgate 11 hb damages.

B'!lt the courl5 hav-9 ruled that :-cmar:riage may not he

introduced in evidence, e.g., Hightower v. Dr. i?epper Bottling Co.
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P.O ..

Dear·· Don,

.
Thank you very much ·for yo4r. recent Jetter dealIng 'with the proposed Wrongful
Death Act �hlct'! ·1:he,Jast . .m�etl�g 9f the:eoard of ·Directors
.. of- the Academy
,·
·
, of .Florida Ti"'hi1 :.Lawyers"· dl_scussed; . '. ·
'

. ., .. '•• ' ..-. �:�- •<•::-.�•- _:._�,-�: -�-: -

·
I
·
r.:_•- :�/ �-�::-:.:•:•.; : � -

'�

-

..

-,,.,# •

'.J. ,:Lj.

.

,•

,

. · Answerlng··.your··se·cphc:l,·parageaph,. L-was not present at· the Law:_Rewf �Ion Com-···
•.mhslon .. me�tlng tn·:Tampa�_ori··_Nov�mber·1.,. It was my ·untlers.tandJng that no ·
_ .·
lmportant'\1c·tIon �as· conteinp fated Insofar as th.e proposed Wrorigfu1 Death
·
,:' �,:: -�·rr< :_.�·:� _Act "!�s·cc,n�ernec:1, and 1.�lect�d to rema.fn·here'to ..d "lscharge othet· responslbMltles.
.�aI sed_ at.. �the: �e..eflng, and ·th_tf h�s .r.�s�l ted . In
. · : !!- ·couifle..;,�f,:nif.P�.r··.·ma�tter�:
b10:·�tnor¢tjang�s t:c,cJar.lfy;tJiem.·.. Qne Is a ml.no,:. change·Jri -language to�make,
It ::qufte::clejr;:that ,.,If.ts,:,contemplatectthat.: lQss of earnings of ·the ·deceased ·:·
.d!!c!t,� .. �:r� ./eC?,ver�bl, ��i ��,, �_he:propos.ed ··�.· .
:· .\)�-_. ···-�· ··'
the .: �,t·e:;citjJ�}�,:y:,,t�t��(.date
·.
·
,:
· ..· .,. w.ro�gfu.t:.dea��-'.'S.� ctJ�._ ·.. J��ls·,���-._. ..-��ntemplate�·a11.•19ng�··1>.ut.oµr,·:l �11iguage.,.: ,;, .·
'·,'" :. ; ·... ·. ;_:..:•t.· 'dJd n<?,ti:.s�em�:c�p,Jit�ly. -�·1ea(.;�9- s011Nt_•. :·:)·t1Js ·clartfy16g -,�ha.l'.'ge:'fias ;beefi'· f!la·d�i//· .' ,,:, 1
.:/ ." ... '; ... -.-" • .·.. The're w�s\al��fts'6inf�\Jiicei:ta.lri'ty/f� t�e(·mJri.d! .�f:-:c s�)1bot.1f,:t·he.··;r•�o,ve�y .�f·
":··<:.- �: /
.
·
u
h
I
c
I
d
s"
w
hen_
·
.
�'
eced�ri
f
R:ers<>".'a'.1
...
r:e1frefs�n�adve
:
i
·
,
'.: .- .�.-� _
·
:
·
��
�
':
or,'..f
'
.
e
.
'
.
rij'ra
t'.expeo�es·
.
,
,b,
y
j:
�
�
.
·
. �:f
i
-�-�-,they�1nal��ee)1:�:t>a .c(:1 '1: ..ad_viin·ce�:liy.�ih:e ::de-cederiJ�•oi; :�v::�O!JN!()n8.,o,r h il -),e·11a·1 f '· who�-, .;_, ; ,:<t; ..
->: :1t=· < '-�·�: .\'·-��ft:�was'}:'�-����f·��r��-���: :-!lf;hl:�!:-��t::�,tt�� ··· c •.a.r,.J.f:1 _e�-- J�)!!i�k,zf•f-�J�a·r:t��at i m_edl_ca J ··�·'. �-� .
-··
_.· :�"';::: =·.. - · ._-·_ .\:::.��d:...fu11�ra_l;;;.e>,,<pens��.".';are�_to .. be..rec;9verec:l-·:'bY any su·ryl-vo·t.•.wtio ·.ha�-�pa-ld�- .but .-· .· . : .
If anyone.·etse·h·a·s.pa'(d them then they·wlll,be"iecovered . by·th�·-personal·
. ... repa:-e�entailve.-,.-_�9.tb. thes� )"er. e .. c;J.arl.fying.... �hanges,:.arid do nQt.�·refleet ··any. · •
,.-�
sslon'.:., ..
.r.aftsijian\'�r.-·the--Ccmnl. ges'?ln,;..su\,stailce�of.:-tbed.ntent:of .th�}�d
.:··�f.t�.-. ·:11::
.. : ; .. · '.}·· > ·.:: -:·(;
·
.':;(,,·
\
·
:
_
?�:·:
,; ·:··�:. ¥..- -r\. ;,�,, . .:-- ��:. .'/:.··/·'."}.: ::/·:::'�"�:.··:; t}1/ /�:.::i:;,::.�;:·: )�.--,·,.
.
.
·
· nc� ·v •··
·'•,:·, ',.· ,
� :.· \ ..) :· ;: ... ; _ Your.·,thlr�; Pal'.'ag�aph_. _d�J s;. -�•.t�'-Jhe.. �ff��frof,, Atlas '"Bropertles; i
:;�_:. , ·'.. · . · ·.· DIdlch�i · •l..f:�tUT�!mel, l .fyi �t��u�·� ; l�,:.h'jj9\to ,y<>µ,r,,.'•P�_r_�gr.ap_h.._f�r, 011' 'page two. ·".·:
yc:,ur. 'qu•s� !-��•::a�re·���.S:�'�d.-�...�.YQ�•-�!.lf's't_,. ._a_s�ed. :_�·fi.the· p_rop.�s.ecf_ ac_t antI• . . ,.
:wll1.. surtlve ·the·· recom
clpates :that ·th�- ·�lstlng .�la tm. for·punJtIve ��mages�.
.
·
:: .mended .·legt s latl�e· :surgery.:·�.. The legls Jat·Ive�)n_tent, ts. tha·t :the ·prppos· ed·
legtslat·ton-have.�r,io �ffe_ct-·,o�Js)s,urv_l,v�h,actlon•..u�less the death r�sults
. _;.from ·the perso�at�.f n].ury.=, tnf.)Jcted ;by .:11;he,.:.foftf:�asor:- �' There-;, ls:. n�'"'fntent
·
,fot occur�_.: lt;'.fs not.repealed ..
'to abolish · FS 46 •.o�t)n cct.:s�s··whei-e'death·aoes:·
�Y any ,section ·of. :th�',,propo_!;ed Act. As. to· the {secon_d · question,, th1:1t Is,·
,.
.
wll th'e·. c·laIm ·-·!nfr�·lve the.'.:demtse· of •th. e�Jnjured vict �m or _.wf_11 . It \tissIpate
.
';''_".. _.. ·

.

w,re_-

': �-•,
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.
ll k• h Is _cla Im for·· Mnte 1 ��d--phys Ica i pa In an4 suffer Ing In�u� �� befo�• ·,
death; �f .beUeve ,lt:'was t� ,lntentlon
.·•f 'he draftsman and.,'.;the Conimlsslon
.
to remain neutral ·on this que.st lon. That Is.why ·the provhJon t hat no
punl_tlve d�ges:would be recoverable was removed frcm an earlier eerslon.
There Is a big question In t�rt· law at :the present time concerning punitive
damages In arill k.lnd_.,of clvl_1 case. ·.If.we could, I think It would be better
to keep thls'.c.ontnwersy out of- �he consl�eratlon .of the proposed Wrongful
.
·
'
D
· eath Ac�· sine• .ft goes f1i"r ·beyond wrongful death actions: and ,af�•cfts'. many
kinds· of-tort·'t'ltfgath,n ·�re no death occurs •..
. On th� other �nd,·•.1_ -think
you have raised a. very 1egl,:�mate point.: There ··rs nothing_ In. our p��•d
Act ..spec:lfl_ca11y deallng with ·pu�l_tf.ve--aaMge.s now,. but our provlsfQh :that .•
no actions of personal Injury shall su'rvlve when a personal lriJur:y·to the ·
decedent results ·tn �Is death contained In sect Ion 768.20 might _be c�·strue_d
.
. .to· eliminate .punitive'. damages froat the wrongful-death •action broughf'.under
the. proposed Act� This· 1s a 1so �c:olor�d. by .the f•c�' that ·the.re�ai'.'e: f:1o�lda..
.
cas�s
holdlJlg· th,it'_pun_l�. Ive. d..-ges are .not, rec:Qvera�le ln\)!,;wrongful.r-�.eat� ·
•
. ..
: · · _'-1' act Ion •. ' t think ·y&, can readily _un·clerstand .. why we would have scme re 1uctance .;':·
.
J -· .to pot.an express ·prov.hlon"·tn t� pn.,�••�-Act-t�•-� p,nlt,_ve dama ge:� ..al"• :_:
.
" ;···, r•cove,:able ,_,._view of the highly cont�v,rstal. nature,of - �'4Ch a·decl�t�tl� •.· , ,·
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:::·· :·.. about ·1t, and leave It to decision·. Need.I•• to say, we were _un..,,ar.e of. the;·.· .. . • -.
,�- Atlas:Propertles·case,as
declde�fby the.Supf'.'818 Court of Fi�rfda-.;•t-:�t
. tie'tflN> _ :-::�•;:·� ·
.
. .. :: .. ·.we,:were drafUng::the . propos�d Act./ I - . would Uke to have a"y-suggestfori' you .. : . \.:_t··•
. , ·_:�
.
11lg�t,'.�r,, _to-�k,.•�t how we- ��ld dlspos� of::'·t"h pr�l ��--.�d·:·.1 �.am '.: -._::{�-·:�•>
,�- .,sending cppfes of this 'letter.. to. '.·scme .of · the .niembers·of·the Commfsslon::�ho·.
·- . -: --�>
. :· . _;. '. ·
'i'lave_·b•n ln¥Qlved:-,,,..�1111pr.ov_ing ,ttie.:.rJ ler:':dr.afts '.SO ttiat ,,:_t:heytrilay::i�b.. tf .i-1·:: ·'.-'·:'�·..::- .
·'..�,=��,�··"'ions 1.so.; :;:1·:.: ��,r!'.��)�H�ve._J�f--�;c,.u,��--tO;.,l•t· a'"�f.ll�f��!'.r ·,·._;·,��>: :·:·
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:�·�t::_ �and 'deciuc;ted...frcn -d� 'awards'·:io·r-th•'.sur�lvor�. -an�jth, '·est•te.d_rf..P,.ropor.i,Jon"_-/·,: · ···..
�;i'h'ls":-.st ··be<'r•d',··rn .con)u�ctlori- with , ·. . "",�·to.the :aiount'.·•·rc1ec1�:to tlf•·•
_�-,ougtit. by :�h•:�ct•c�d.•nt '-s:�-.- ._. · · ··; ::· ,.:.
,�--- ' :� . sectl' on _768.2�_::ttro�ld l�s1t
. lla.�.'.-it.e:: ,�, J)inr·s�)
:.A:
.' _-. · : _,personal fo�rep,..sentattve, who.· shaJ.Lrecover-�for,t: �11• beneflt::of . the'.:·�•�en,-•s·,
. _,.·
.
· -- . ..__. . suivlvors·ancl estate� -•tc •. The provlilon:·�:.:lltlgatlon'·expen_..s .'on 1y ·con• ','. - /. �taplates the ett.omey's-,.-S:'.:and ·expei,sef lricu·rred by the.p4trtonaJ··repre.sen•
--. ' ·. tat Ive�-. providing for the -�' locat Ion �Qr a1 L t�se ..ex�s•� :,l��itrr� -by �he·\ - : ·
personal representatl.ve to t� .,.rds :111ac1e,.t
- o sli,:vlvo'rs and.�the ·estate, ·which
.
atllOUftt:S·•st be separately·stated· in.the Ye9'.'_dlct�'as req11_1recLby'.,sect'lon.'.768.22� ·/.
· It ukes no difference whether the·_peraonal repr�sentetlve•)ingages one:,.- . ·-,� - _
- attorn�y or several.·_ The t�t•I anaou
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to the_ survfvors and: the ••tate. Remember: the.
'person� 1 r�pre�en�_atlv
_ •( ·1s a )ways the p1a In"t Iff �nd not the_ surv. I vors i - Your
question-obviously . contemplates the posslbl. l l ty of a number_of plalntlffs,
·but the Act.will not permit this •. If sme survivor sees-flt to -engage·
counsel�to
represent- his lnterests_alone, this d�s not make- that survivor
.
_ _:a.-plalntlff '"- the wrongfutd�ath·actlon, and any·.. attorneys' ·fees _to be paid
�y such a'survlvor would be-·purely.a raatter ·of contract:·be�e•n .h'ln, ancS:·the_
·· attorney' and· would n9t be payabl_e out ··of any ·amounts recovered u.,der �h•.
propose4 Ac� •.. I hope . this clarifies t'-11,� _f11!1tter, ·because_ l.. .bel Ieve_ you wl11
agree on further-.conslderatlon·that l_t ls· a:fa_lrly' reasonable·provlslon,
since expenses.of_lftlgatlon · are u·sua11y deductecl'_frcm· recoverl•� Jn w_r�g
ful ,death actions where the contract .for attorneys•· fees Is normally on a ·.
,< contingent· basis •. The· reaeon this questlc;n· has no't·troubled· us -f� .the past·.
-, ·1s .-because :there· Is ·only one class; able .to recover under the-:pfesent :/; .. ,
. · ,W rongful:. De•th--Act_ ·of /Flor Id�, an�"_o_thers. who :suff�r
loss•���clo .not ::P�� ·any: _.
_
, attorney,!s fees becau.se they don't. get any :awa_rd as they wlll...:und�r . tlie: -:.:riaf Act-,r.. :SJ�e··:th.-r� may be quite a few,�urv l vors plus the estate' shar-lng
In :a r•�ov�ry un�er -tl:ae proposed Act, .It b.ec:cmes necessary to · provlC,e .. •
. . :,__,:some rational -�ystem· for allocating the ·Ilt'lgatlon<expense to thelr:.iards •
' ahe..·tmp�rtance of the prov.l's.Ion ·that':t11.•�·awar4s must
be' sta,ed >separately
. . , : 'l'hus ·t
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- -.::'-. ' ":.: H-ppre.cJa.te-the- kind words .contained ·_l.,:1\yo_ur · conc:ludlng paragraphs._- ;: You . ·. .
,: ;--":. ,j·. ::·:, - .' /�- / �jrf.bif/ij� l te, .sur•-:' thaf'the· dr�ftsman· an_d(the, Conim l s·s Ion have -b-..,-'stflctly .
.that wll l'"doju's'.tl�i-to--<:
(Death.
·'-':.�_:.:"/ �--/· 'L.,S��·-.c:oricer.n�·'.Wlth!prc;au�.1hg a;-n�
c
h
·r_efl�, t:�a171';�.1 �g t_ened{�on�•r�(f:�r-·t_be_-. lnt.eres(o.f.-(t��(���f•}.
,_.: .- -�': •· .' ,. ·."" ',· putil.l c;,Jnrth l s ar�i.:._:1 L am_·also �ce.rne�,..•b�t the .wrongfuLdeatH· of':•··:.-:•.;·, .
1
·
_ fs_ l_<�•(�};�•'.�:/};·,:0·;,
rY:(�:b_le:.��'l���t:!n.fa·n_��a·::··t�_t_ yPli•:_�n"!1?!' � ib½t . --�-"·· ear.I_1-�r prov
-{,
?)
-,result!td ·Jn the· def.eat of- the ,proposea;,ct · ,,
·..-,�,- �=�: ·:� · ·-,,,., ?·::: ·-t.lnc:l�d•d···on·thls,
. . matter-probably.
'"
.
1np-t�{last'.:��ssl_�- .. of . the legis_·1atu_�•:•<.:_l·bel l ave the bes't''.�ay to·��_n81e �--= · .·
- .� -, ·
.. � that.problem ls. separate 1egls1atlon r,ather than risk the defeat of the
.
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·.',:\� -�-.': ;_ .:,i . ;::.·ani·impres'sed"'wlth''the 'Statesnianlllileposlt1on_
yo·u have taken�--1n'your:·1eher
_; · ,.. .-_.�,._,- , .. : >:__.<·-�t -of- Noveqlbe,r:. 7th·,_·b·ecause'.'. you -�vfousJy_:�-p :ree-l•te -:.that the -· pfoposed·:Act::-::; '- · ·-_ ;:/·. e a 1 f:�h·e wl 5.�_�f �f :-•ver gfoup -�nc1·--�t ll): ha,v,, an _: ;-- :t:- :�
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··enactnint, /f"bel Ieve, and yet:' It· does. prov.I de ·a ..far· better: sys�tim -of·> . -'· �:
.. :·canpensatlon:'f� -those -who· suffer-. the ·conse�ences" of. the wrongful_ -�eilth of·

,.. :,:_ .:_.'. .. - '.: _: of

'
·
· a·:near rela,_t'lye:,:t�n present-·1aw.· In this State.
·P;:ease- ��i7�--h�) ·,r�_.y�·a� l-n �� :;:r con�enlence. Again,
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Wagner, Cunningham & Vaughan
4JB :.Morgan- Street, Su Ite 102.
Tampa -,florlda · . 33602
:-

--�

1

·,..·:·

Dear B111::.
,-

,o

your letters about
Plea�� <�cept my apol ogy. for .the delay In--- �epl_yfng.
proposed.death act� You have probably-already heard.about the reslgn
etfon:of,Dean Maloney •.
-This.has resulted .In some disarray here at the
·.law,schoo.1; .and my·cwn sltuatf� .h�•- been_comp1teated .�Y Illness from.
J�_�i. getting _.caughtuJJp. with rny -.corres- .
,r,hlch I -have-new recovered. I,�
··
.pondenee. ., .,. , .: . ".;---: .
�:---.:..
..· .; . ·.

the
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J,wonh,·attempt; to answer_-,every _polnt·;that:·you!·ralse�-ln your letter ..
let':.me,.,say�f.trst�,?��•;,_ that�_-1 -� :very��f,,efut/t� .:Y,?,U ;for .cal fl!'g ,out
atten.t-1� t�·the__ fact_,.tha�-:-the_,effe��lveJla�e ..•{n th_etrep_e�les: dld."_not ,flt�
3'h I Siit_came- a�ut beo,,u_sa�.a·
. ",: eaa:-1J ,,i
:\pr��• 1: prov!_ �-�d:_���.�-t
;i.
the, �i-aC��_I_� i(�•�ff�.t..1 ve
, :JIP,Oll,�;�:•�t�t.:?1����:�:l1i,r�tt .; "!f8S .,_G�!CJ�•d
that*lt would .be· better-1 io::.establlsh ..some futut.e·ctate as,v,the;effeetlve ....
·:ctate{.-� ,Thi S'Wa'S.tdone,:\but ·no
rem�ltl'ed tc{'chailge the ·-rei>ea ,.;:-- ela�oe .,,.
to flt It. We have done this now, and I am sure you have a copy of the
·pamphlet� c:ontalnJng•:the n ew language.:•- -:·;;;,,;.-i.,:
-:.• .. �,
.,.. _.
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;Concer..11lng ...t:he'-appr9Yal of sett·l.•nt, 1.-,don 't think we can do anything
about settl�nts before an action 1s filed. Since under the proposed act
'the:�1y ��1'.•wh�--�J.�1-'i�t�J_e .. wlth.-��._..,.-wout� :ba.}:�.htr'R,er,spnal..
npr,sentatil,l'e:of. ,he_ �ec;ea,sed ...� pr•--� 1_.v.�he-;wouJd_,be subJe.it::tf>: the ..
or.ders...t>f the cour•·.-.appolntlng him to;.act:..Jn..a flducta·ry ca�ty-_ -so.-that
he.could be ren,O,Ved:and fraudulent -.settlenients•\Set ashie,, etc. Section
.768.·2S-on ·court- appr�a1 ;.of -�ettlements p°rovldes that there can be a
·s\9tt·1ement.ieven· where_,there.Js object fon·or- there h a-tnlnQr provlded;·the
iettlement i�sap�t-<nedlbi,y the court. Again, a settlement would be between
the personal representative of the deceased and the tortfeaser .rather
than'fihetween the survivors- and, the ::tortfeasor.
.,. . ,\· :. ,! ..-· :,.
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\,{&,certain1 y lnteitd��:: adopted :�l\l�drtlf\. WO\,lJd b•.: .,.lJ:h.lJt . the def.Jn Itlon 4
of, mfnor·chl1dren. •-f'·'At -Ol'\e·.poln.t-•We expresJ..!lt Included them In the defini
tions section, but several members of the-'fmf Revision Commission thought

Mr. B 111, Wagner
Page two.
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that was unnecessary In view of the Florida legislation making the rights
of adopted children the same as natural .children.
t underJtan'd your objection . to the term""dependent 11: but 1· do not know
what the solu�lon Is. As to llmltlng·the recovery for support· to 21 years.
thls Is Intended only
. In the·case of healthy minor. chlJdrep., .See Section
76�.21 (1). ·
.,_., ., ·
.

'

. .,, .,

..

,

As .to SectlC!_l'l 768. ·26 dealing with litigation expens�s, thfs lsJntended
'eo1:'.Ct»ver only the feei·patd·by the personal representative. After all•
�he proposed act only contemplates that the personal representative will
b_
. a .a plaintiff, arid It_ Is the fees that· he pays·,for ·representation, In the
aetlon that ·this secdon is designed to cover.· To:an�r your guest Ion
,�ry �I rec�,_y/thf st�tute �templates_ that the cl•lmants. �hall a_p_ sl!'k
e;
or swJm
tQgether ... Tt;�y are_ not partles, ..and If they_ .have the Ir o,,n law...
y�rs.'they'_c:a��·make :�hatever: contract for fees that . they qke. ·.It w_l 11 not
come out of ·the settlementor 'judgement ,amounts-1:that ,are x•c�lve�,.�Y the
.person•l, represent�tlve for distribution to them. We felt that something
had to·-·be·· pl"o\1lded-on thl·s�•-Jor e1se·:'scmeone·.mlght-4Jalm _that the ent Ire
amount of the 1 ega1 fees pa Id by the person� 1 representat'i ve. shou 1 d come
out of the portion golilggto the estate of:the-•�sed. Your suggestion
that we Insert the expression 11 1n the absence of written agreement to the
contrary" at the beginning of the section under consideration would.not
be very fair If the personal representative entered Into a w ritten agree•
ment that the attorney fees would be p·a1d,.ent1re1y from one· of the sur•
vlvor•s shares. The section conterriplattfs.i, e- falr1 and equitable contribution
.. b'f ,al.I beneficiaries to the attorney's fees and other- expenses of 1ltlgatlon.
"To

�n'sw•·r·anothe·r question,

a11 the e1alments are required to make their
In the same action. They cannot release the defendant;.only the
p•esonal representative of the deceased can do that.

claim

hiatus possible, In my opinion, between.-a claim under F .s. 45.11
and one arising under the new act If the death takes place In 1971. If
the death t akes place In 1971, then the new act controls both as to the
disposition of the survival claim and damages for wrongful death. In
other words, the claim that the deceased had while he still lived will,
after December 31, 1910, abate and be part of the new action for wrongful
death.

There Is no

On the same reasoning as was used above concerning adoptive children,
believe the definition section Includes adoptive parents tn the term
" parent s". It does not lnc:lude step-parents who have no legal status
unless there has been an adoption.

(����

1,

Mr. 8111 Wagner
Page Three·
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Flnal Draft 5/22/69

DRAFT OF RECOMMENDED DEATH ACT
Section 1. Sections 768.01, 768.02, and 768.03, Florlda Statutes,
are hereby repealed.
Section 2. Short Title.

This act may be cited as the "F1orlda

Wrongful Death Act."
Section 3. State policy.

It Is the publlc polfcy of the state

to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs froin the survivors
of the decedent to the wrongdoer. This act Is remedial and shall be
llberally construed.
Section 4.
(1)

Definitions. As used In this act:
"Survivors" ineans the deced.ent 's spouse, ,nlnor children,

parents, and, when partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for support
or services, any blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters.

It

Includes the lllegltfmate child of a 1110ther, but not the lllegltlmate
child of the father unless the father has recognized a responstbfllty for
the chlld's support by flnanelal contrlbutfon or otherwise.
(2)

"Minor children" means unmarried children under twenty•

one years of age.
(3)

"Support" Includes contributions in kind as we.I I as 1110ney.

(4)

"Services" means tasks, usually of a household nature,

regularly performed by the decedent that will be a necessary expense to
the survivors of the decedent.

These services may vary according to the

Identity of the decedent and survivor and shall be determined under the
particular facts of each case.
(5) "Net accumulations" fl'leans the part of the decedent's
expected net business or salary Income, Including pension benefits and
lncone fr� life estates, that the decedent probably would have retained
as savings and left as part of his estate If he had Jived his nor�al
llfe expectancy. Net business or salary lncoine Is the part of the de
cedent's probable gross Income after taxes, excluding Inc� fron In•
vestrnents contfnufng beyond death, that remains after deducting the
decedent's personal expenses and support of survivors excluding contrlbutlons In kind.
Sections.

Right of action. When the death of a person Is caused

by the wrongful act, negllgence, default, or breach of contract or
warranty of any person, and the event would have entitled the person
Injured to maintain an action and recover damages If death had not
ensued. the person or watercraft that would have been I fable In damages
If death had not ensued shall be liable for damages as specified In this
act notwithstanding the death of the person Injured, although death was
caused under circumstances constftutlng_a felony.
Section 6.

Parties. The action shall be brought by the decedent's

personal representative. who shall recover for the use and benefit of
the decedent's survivors and estate all damages, as specified In this
act, caused by the Injury resulting In death. When a personal Injury
results In the death, no action for personal fnjurfes of the decedent
shall survive, and any action pending at the tfrne of death shall abate.

- 3 The wrongdoer's personal representative shall be the defendant If the

wrongdoer dies before or pending the action. A defense that would bar
or reduce a survivor's recovery If he were the plalntlff may

be

asserted

against him, but shall not affect the recovery of any other survivor.
Section 7.

Da�ages. All potential beneficiaries of a recovery for

wrongful death, Including the decedent's estate, shall be Identified In
the complaint and their relationships to the decedent shall be alleged.

No punitive damages shall be awarded under this act.

Damages �ay be

awarded as follows:
(I)

Each survivor may recover the fair value of lost support

and services from the time of the decedent's Injury to hls death, with
Interest, and future loss of support and services from the time of death
and reduced to present value.

In evaluating loss of support -nd services,

the survivor's relationship to the decedent, the amount of the decedent's
probable net Income available for distribution to the particular sur•
vlvor, and the replacement value of the decedent's services to the
eurvlvor may be considered.

In coinputing the duration of future losses,

the Joint llfe expectancies of the survivor and the decedent and the per
iod of minority In the case of healthy �inor chfldren may be considered.
(2) The surviving spouse may also recover a reasonable amount
for loss of the decedent's companionship and protection and for inental
pain and suffering from the date of Injury.
(3)

Minor children of the decedent may also recover a reason

able amount for lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance
end for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.

4 -

(4) Each parent of a deceased �inor child may also recover•
reasonable amount forrnental pain and suffering from the date of fnjury.

(5) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's Injury
or death may be recovered by a survivor who has paid them.
(6)

The decedent's personal representative may recover for

the estate the following:
(a)

The net acc�ulatfons lost to the estate due to the

decedent's injury, with interest.

This a�ount may not be calculated

beyond death unless the decedent's survivors include a surviving spouse
or lineal descendants.

If the decedent's survivors Include a surviving

spouse or lineal descendants, loss of net accumulations beyond death
and reduced to present value may be recovered.
(b)

Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's

Injury or death that have become a charge against the estate.
(7)

All awards for the decedent's estate are subject to the

claims of creditors as provided in §733.16.
Section 8.

Separate awards.

The amounts awarded to each survivor

end to the estate shall be stated separately.
Sectfon 9.

Protection of minors and Incompetents.

The court may

put In trust or provide other protection for any amount awarded for the
benefit of a minor child or an incompetent.
Section 10.

Death of a survivor before Judgment.

A survivor's

death before final judgment shall limit the survivor's recovery to lost
support and services to the date of his death.

The personal representa

tive shall pay the amount recovered to the estate of the deceased survivor.

-sSection II. Settlement. When an action under this act Is pending,
the court �ust approve any settlernent as to amount and apportfoninent
among the beneficiaries If any survivor objects to the settlement or Is
a minor or frnc:ornpetent.
Section 12.

Litigation expenses.

Attomeys' fees and other ex•

penses of litigation shall be paid by the personal representative and
deducted from the awards to the survivors and the estate In proportion
to the ainount awarded to them, but particular expenses shall be deducted
from the awards to survivors who received the benefit of the expenses.
Section 13. Effective date.

This act shall take effect on Jan•

uary I, 1970, and shall not apply to deaths occurring before that date.
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FOREWORD

The Florida Law Revision Commission was created by the 1967
Legislature ( §§ 13.90 - 13.996 Florida Statutes). In terms of the
Statute the Commission is to:
" ( 1) examine the common law, constitution and statutes
of the state and current judicial decisions for the purpose of
discovering defects and anachronisms in the end and recom
mending needed reforms; ( 2) recommend, from time to time,
such changes in the law as it deems proper to modify or elim
inate antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to bring
the law of the state into harmony with modern conditions;
( 3) conduct such surveys or research of the law of Florida
as the Legislature may request."
The Commission presents to the Bench and Bar of Florida, for
consideration and suggestions for improvement, the following recom
mendation and report on a proposed statute on the subject of death
by wrongful act.
The Commission requests that all suggestions be submitted as soon
as possible, and in any event before January 30, 1970, to any Com
mission member or to the Commission office in Gainesville.
December 20, 1969
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wrongful deaths acts throughout the United States are in a state
of disarray. Florida's is no exception. Some of the results that are
possible under the wrongful death legislation of Florida can only be
fairly described as deplorable. The Florida courts have increasingly
called attention to these defects, and some of the recent judicial calls
for legislative help have had a plaintive and desperate quality.
An impressive effort to answer the calls for help occurred in 1957
with the publication of "The Florida Death Acts" by Leo M. Alpert,
Esq., in IO University of Florida Law Review 153 ( 1957). Mr. Alpert
concluded his article with a bill introduced in the 1957 Legislature
by Messrs. Sweeny and Karl of Volusia County, which would have
completely rewritten F.S. Section 768.02 in order to eliminate some
of the defects. It was killed in committee. It is hoped that this cur
rent effort will meet a better fate.
Another very valuable study entitled "Florida's Wrongful Death
Law: Time for a Change" was written by David K. Deitrich, Esq.,
when he was a law student at the University of Florida. It may be
found in 18 University of Florida Law Review 637 ( 1966).
There are several things wrong with the wrongful death situation
in Florida, but suffice it to say here that Florida's current position
seems to be to minimize recoveries when there are many dependents
left by the deceased and to maximize recoveries when no one is left
dependent on the deceased. It takes no expert in the law to realize
that this policy is diametrically opposed to what one would expect
to be the objective in this area. Further, dependents of the deceased
sometimes most deserving and needful of support are occasionally left
without any recovery at all. As if these horribles were not enough,
the present state of our law encourages a multiplicity of litigation
and a great deal of uncertainty about the damages recoverable.
In submitting this proposal for change, the reporter is not naive
enough to think that there will not be some objection. This is a fairly
sensitive area of the law where legal fees are often measured by the
amount of recovery, and so anything that tends to minimize or maxi
mize amounts currently recoverable may generate some opposition
from lawyers who are deeply committed to the cause of plantiffs or
defendants. We have endeavored in drafting a statute to ignore this
approach and consider only the valid objective of such legislation.
This objective is to allow a full recovery on behalf of those who were
7

dependent on the deceased and who have sustained demonstrable
losses of support and services by the wrongful death. In drafting
with that objective constantly in mind, this proposal will increase
damages in some instances and decrease them in others as compared
to the present law. Such result is unavoidable.
If those interested in such legislation approach it from the stand
point of only favoring those aspects that favor their own position in
such law suits, then we will probably have another stand-off and
there will be no reform in 1969 just as in 1957. It would be most
gratifying if the approach would be instead to consider that the
pluses and minuses strike an approximate balance in the end, and that
this proposal has the supreme virtue over the present law in that it
assures that the recovery will go to those who really need it and not
as windfalls to distant relatives. No affront is intended when it is
suggested that all concerned view this proposal from a statesmanlike
point of view.
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II.

RECOMMENDED WRONGFUL DEATH ACT

A bill to be entitled
An act relating to wrongful death action; amending
chapter 768, Florida Statutes, by adding sections
768.16, 768.17, 768.18, 768.19, 768.20, 768.21, 768.22,
768.23, 768.24, 768.25, 768.26, and 768.27; providing
for a right of action on behalf of the survivors
and the estate by the personal representative of a
decedent whose death is caused by the wrongful act,
negligence, default, or breach of contract or warranty of any person; repealing sections 768.01, 768.02,
and 768.03, Florida Statutes; providing an effective
date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Chapter 768, Florida Statutes, is amended by
adding sections 768.16, 768.17, 768.18, 768.19, 768.20, 768.21,
768.22, 768.23, 768.24, 768.25, 768.26, and 768.27 to read:
768.16 Short title.-Sections 768.16 through 768.27 may be
cited as the "Florida wrongful death act."
768.17 Legislative intent.-It is the public policy of the
state to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs
from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer. Sections
768.16 through 768.27 are remedial and shall be liberally construed.
768.18 Definitions.-As used in sections 768.16 through
768.27:
( 1) "Survivors" means the decedent's spouse, minor children, parents, and, when partly or wholly dependent on the
decedent for support or services, any blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters. It includes the illegitimate child of a
mother, but not the illegitimate child of the father unless the
father has recognized a responsibility for the child's support.
( 2) "Minor children" means unmarried children under
twenty-one ( 21) years of age.
( 3) "Support" includes contributions in kind as well as
money.
( 4) "Services" means tasks, usually of a household nature, regularly performed by the decedent that will be a necessary expense to the survivors of the decedent. These services
may vary according to the identity of the decedent and survivor
and shall be determined under the particular facts of each case.
9
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( .'5) ··'.'.'ct accumulations" means the part of the decedent's
expected net hminess or salary income, including pension bene
fits, that the decedent probably would have retained as savings
and left as part of his estate if he had lived his normal life
expectancy. Net business or salary income is the part of the
decedent's probable gross income after taxes, excluding income
from inwstments continuing beyond death, that remains after
deducting the decedent's personal expenses and support of sur
vivors excluding contributions in kind.
76S.19 Higl1t of action.-When the death of a person is
caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default, or breach of
contrac:t or warranty of any person, including those occurring
on navigable waters, and the event would have entitlC'd the
person injun•d to maintain an action and recover damages if
dl'ath had not ensul'd, thl' pl'rson or watercraft that would have
been liable in damages if death had not ensued shall he liable
for damagl·� as �pt•dfied in this act nothwithstanding the death
of tlw person injun·d. although death was caused under circum
stancl·� con�tituting a felony.
76'>.20 Partil's.-Tlw action shall be brought by the de
Cl'dPnt's pnson,1I reprt•M·ntatin•, who shall recover for the bene
fit of thP dect"cl1·11t \ �un h or� and l'�tatl' all damages, as specified
in thi� ad, c·.ms1•d by tlw injury resulting in death. \Vlwn a
per�onal injury to the decedent results in his death, no action
for the per�onal injury shall survive, and any such action pend
ing at the time of death shall abate. The wrongdoer's personal
n·prl'�mlalin.' shall he tlw defendant if the wrongdoer dies he
fore or pending the action. A <lden�e that would har or reduce
a �un'i\-01:� reCO\'l'IY if he were the plaintiff may be asserted
again�t him. hut shall not affect the recovery of any other
survi\'or.
768.21 D.unages.-All potential beneficiaries of a recovery
for wrongful death, including the decedent's estate, shall he
identified in the complaint and their relationships to the de
cedent shall he allt•ged. Damages may he awarded as follows:
( l ) Each survivor may recover the value of lost support
and �er\'ices from the clatl• of the decedent's injury to his death,
"ith interest, and future loss of support and services from the
d.1te of death and reduced to present value. In evaluating loss
of support and services, the survivor's rc>lationship to the
deced!'l1t, tlw amount of the decedent's prohahle net income
arnilable for dbtrihution to the particular sunfror, and the re-
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placement value of the decedent's services to the survivor may
be considered. In computing the duration of future losses, the
joint life expectancies of the survivor and the decedent and the
period of minority in the case of healthy minor chil<lrm may be
considered.
(2) The surviving spouse may also recover for loss of the
decedent's companionship and protection and for mental pain
and suffering from the date of injury.
(3) Minor children of the decedent may also n•cover
for lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and
for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.
(4) Each parent of a deceased minor child may also re
cover for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.
(5) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's
injury or deillh may be recovered hy a survivor who has paid
them.
(6) The decedent's personal representative may recover
for the decedent's estate the following:
;,, ,�tr1 (a) Loss of earnings of the deceased from the <late of
ittqt:tiry to the date of death, less lost support of sur\'ivors ex
cluding contributions in kind, with interest. If the decedent's
survivors include a survi\'ing spouse or lineal cleseendents, loss
of net accumulations beyond death and reduced to present
value may also be recovered.
(b) Medical or funeral expenses clue to the decedent's
injury or death that have become a charge against his estate or
that were paid hy or on behalf of decedent, c-..cluding amounts
recoverahle under suhscction (5).
(7) All awards for the decedent's t•state are suhject to
the claims of creditors who have complied with the require
ments of probate law concerning claims.
768.22 Form of verdict.-The amounts awarded to each
survivor and to the estate shall he slated separately in the
verdict.
768.2:3 Protl•ction of minors and incompetents.-The court
may put in trust or proviclt• other protection for any amount
awarded for tlw lwncfit of a minor child or an incompetent.
76S.24 Death of a survivor before judgment-A survivor's
death before final judgment shall limit the survivor's recovery
to lost support and services to the <late of his death. The
personal representative shall pay the amount recovered to the
personal representative of the deceased survivor.
11

1
768.25 Court approval of settlements.-While an action'
2 under this act is pending,no settlement as to amount or appor3 tionment among the beneficiaries which is objected to by any
4 survivor or which affects a survivor who is a minor or an incom5 petent shall be effective unless approved by the court.
6
768.26 Litigation expenses.-Attomeys' fees and other ex7 penses of litigation shall be paid by the personal representative
8 and deducted from the awards to the survivors and the estate
9 in proportion to the amount awarded to them , but expenses in10 curred for the benefit of a particular survivor or the estate shall
11 be paid from their awards.
12
768.27 Effective date .-Sections 768.16 through 768.27shall
13 take effect on January 1, 1971, and shall not apply to deaths
14 occurring before that date.
15
Section 2. Sections 768.01, 768.02, and 768.03 , Florida
16 Statutes, are repealed when this Act takes effect.

III. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT AT COMMON LAW
A. Lord Ellenborough's dictum in Baker v. Bolton (1808). The
common law rule recognized in the United States denies recovery in
a civil action for the death of a person caused by the neglect or
wrongful act of another. This rule descends directly from Lord
Ellenborough's famous dictum to the effect that "... in a civil court,
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury".1 This proposition became the basis for the common law rule
as adopted by practically all subsequent cases.
B. Historic origins of the rule against recovery. History provides
a plausible explanation for Lord Ellenborough's statement. Anglo
Saxon England treated all homicides as private (civil), not criminal
wrongs.2 As in many societies, the existence of the blood feud was
relied upon to keep the peace. Every killing brought vengence upon
the head of the wrong-doer at the hands of the deceased's kinsmen
down to the sixth cousin.3 Eventually the conflict between the loyalty
of the kin and their desire for a quiet life resulted in frequent efforts
to end the feud by the payment of just compensation. This punitive
payment was paid directly to the kinsmen, the amount depending
upon the decedent's social rank.4
Further transition, partially caused by expansion of the notion of
the "King's Peace," resulted in combining this "wergild " with a fine
to the Crown for each homicide. 5 By the 13th century the change
was complete with every homicide, no matter how caused, treated
as a criminal offense.6 Accidental or involuntary homicides were not
treated as felonies since they lacked the necessary mental element,
but the defendant's property nonetheless was forfeited to the Crown.1
Homicides of this nature were called killings per infortunium8 and
were not considered crimes but misfortunes.° "Yet, because the king
hath lost his subject, and that men should be more careful, he ( de
fendant) forfeits his goods.. . ."10
There was no action for damages by the deceased' s survivors
mainly because his goods being forfeit, the defendant was left "judg
ment proof." The merger doctrine, that a tort merges into a felony,
is no doubt derived from this situation.
It is generally agreed that the Baker v. Bolton decision was the
product of Lord Ellenborough's confusion between two separate legal
doctrines, that expressed by the maxim actio personalis moritur cum
persona ( personal actions die with the person) and that of merger.

12
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The first was certainly not applicable since the plaintiff was suing in
his own behalf and not as the decedent's personal representative.
The merger doctrine was also a poor basis for denying plantiff his
remedy since merger operated only where the act causing death was
of a criminal nature.11 But as pointed out by Dean Prosser, Lord
Ellenborough's "...forte was never common sense".12
C. Tl1e rule in America. Baker v. Bolton, with its rule based
neither upon precedent nor logic, was accepted by nearly all American
courts though there is much evidence of hesitation.13 Baker was
followed in Massachusetts as early as 1848,14 and Hawaii seems to be
the only American Jurisdiction where an early rejection of the rule
has not been overcome by later decision.Jj
Being hesitant to accept an irrational proposition of law, American
courts resorted to makeweight arguments on behalf of the Baker rule.
All of these arguments revolved around the "numberless actions" for
damages of an "awful magnitude" which would result from a contrary
rule, rn and the impossibility of calculating the pecuniary value of a
lifc. 17 These arguments carry little conviction when it is realized that
most of thc•m were advanced subsequent to Britain's legislative renun
ciation in 1846 of the old rule that no action exists.
As one noted author has pointed out, the effect of Lord Ellen
borough's faulty analysis upon the common law was to make it
·•. . . more profitable for the defendant to kill the plantiff than to
scratch him." 18

IV. STATUTOHY HEMEDIES FOil DEATH
BY WHONGFUL ACT
A. Lor<l Campbell's Act. The first remedy for wrongful death was
created in England in 1846 by the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act.
This act reads as follows:
9 & 10 Viet C/1 93. Act for compensating the Families of
Persons killed hy Accidents
Whereas no Action at Law is now maintainable against a
Person who hy his wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default may
have caused the Death of another Person, and it is often
times right and expedient that the Wrong-doer in such
Case should be answerable in Damages for the injury so
caused by him: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's
most excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Con
sent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons,
in this present Parliament assembled, by the Authority of
the same, That whensoever the Death of a Person shall be
caused by wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default, and the Act,
Neglect, or Default is such as would ( if Death had not
ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an
Action and recover Damages in respect thereof, then and
in every such Case the Person who would have been liable
if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for
Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured
and although the Death shall have been caused under such
Circumstances as amount in Law to Felony.
II. And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for
the Benefit of the Wife, Husband, Parent, and Child of the
Person whose Death shall have been so caused, and shall
be brought by and in the name of the Executor or Admin
istrator of the Person deceased; and in every such Action
the Jury may give such Damages as they m,ly think pro
portioned to the Injury resulting from such Death to the
Parties respectively for whom ,md for whose Bt•nefit such
Action shall he brought; and the Amount so reco\'ercd,
after deducting the Cost not recovered from the Defend
ant, shall be divided amongst the beforementioned Parties
in such Shares as the Jury by their Verdict shall find and
direct.
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III. Provided always, and he it enacted, That not more
than One Action shall lie for and in respect of the same
Subject Matter of Complaint, and that every such Action
shall be commenced within Twelve Calendar Months after
the Death of such deceased Person.
IV. And be it enacted, That in every such Action the
Plaintiff on the Record shall be required, together with
the Declaration to deliver to the Defendant or his Attorney
a full Particular of the Person or persons for whom and on
whose Behalf such Action shall be brought, and of the
Nature of the Claim in respect of which Damages shall be
sought to he recovered.
V. And be it enacted, That the following Words and
Expressions are intended to have the Meaning hereby as
signed to them respectively, so far as such Meanings are
not excluded by the Context or by the nature of the Sub
ject Matter; that is to say, Words denoting the Singular
Number are to be understood to apply also to the Plurality
of Persons or Things; and Words denoting the Masculine
Gender are to be understood to apply also to Persons of
the Feminine Gender; and the Word "Person" shall apply
to bodies Politic and Corporate; and the Word "Parent"
shall include Father and Mother, and Grandfather and
Grandmother, and Stepfather and Stepmother, and the
Word "Child" shall include Son and Daughter, and Grand
son and Granddaughter, and Stepson and Stepdaughter.
VI. And be it enacted, That this Act shall come into
operation from and immediately after the issuing thereof,
and that nothing therein contained shall apply to the Part
of the United Kingdom called Scotland.
VII. And be it enacted, That this Act may be amended or
repealed by any Act to be passed in this session of Parlia
ment.

ages for the Injury so caused by him: ..." It must have resulted, at
least in part, from a recognition that the rule denying an action for
a tortious killing was an accident of history.
2. Distinctive features of the Act. Briefly stated, Lord Campbell's
act provides that whenever a person's death is caused by the wrong
ful act, neglect, or default of another under circumstances that would
have entitled the party injured to sue for personal injuries had death
not ensued, an action may be brought within one year of his death
in the name of his personal representative solely for the benefit of
certain relatives of the deceased. These relatives include the wife,
husband, parents (including stepparents and grandparents), and
.
children (including stepchildren and grandchildren). Parties hahie
under the act include bodies politic and corporate as well as indi
viduals. The total award is to be determined by the jury according
to the damages they may think resulted to the persons for whose
benefit the action is brought. This total award, however, is to he
divided among the beneficiaries by the personal representative as the
jury may direct.
.
Those features of the act of greatest significance theoretically are
the following: (I) an entirely new cause of action was created when
death resulted from the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another;
(2) the new cause of action was limited to those cases where the
deceased would have had a valid cause of action for personal injuries
had death not ensued; (3) though the action could be brought only
in the name of the deceased's personal representative, the cause of
action was actually that of the named beneficiaries to whom recovery
was limited; and (4) damages were to be measured and awarded
only with respect to the losses suffered by the beneficiaries disre
garding any losses, either tangible or intangible, to the decedent or
his estate.
B. Florida's acts affecting tcrongful deatl1. Lord Campbell's Act
was followed by the enactment in many states and in Canada of
statutes modeled after it. Florida, likewise, created an action for
wrongful death during the late 19th century.

1. Parliamentary intent. No doubt the inherent injustice of
denying a cause of action for death due to another's wrongful act
was the motivating factor behind the enactment of this act. As the
act's title and preamble state, it was designed to provide compensa
tion for the families of those persons killed ", ..since it is oftentimes
right and expedient that the Wrongdoer . .. be answerable in Dam-

I. Survival Statute. At common law, not only was a remedy for
wrongful death denied, hut, similarly, there was a failure to provide
a remedv for personal injuries to a person who died either before
bringing,or before completing a personal injury action. Just as British
_
and American wrongful death statutes of the Lord Campbell s type
attempted to cr<.'ate a cause of action for wrongful death, "su�vi�al
_
statutes" were enacted to provide a remedy for personal m1unes
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where the injured person died. Florida's survival statute presently
reads as follows:
F.S. §46.021 Actions; surviving death of party
No cause of action dies with the person. All causes of
action survive and may be commenced, prosecuted and
defended in the name of the person prescribed by law.
Survival statutes are conceptually different from wrongful death acts
since the former permit recovery by the deceased's personal repre
sentative for those injuries sustained by the decedent prior to death
and the latter provide recovery for the injuries sustained by survivors
because of the death itself. The prime difference between the two
types of statutes is that the survival statute continues in existence the
claim of the deceased himself as an asset of his estate, while the·
wrongful death statute creates a new claim based upon the death
rather than the personal injury, usually for the benefit of the de
ceased's heirs or next of kin.
Florida's survival statute is mentioned at this point solely to show
that the death of a person due to injuries received at the hands of
a wrongdoer may result in more than one cause of action based upon
the same tortious act. A more thorough discussion of the survival
statute, including the damages recoverable thereunder, will be in
cluded in a later section of this report.
2. F.S. §768.01 - Florida's Death Act. Florida's statute creating
a cause of action for wrongful death was originally passed in 1883.19
A second provision, passed simultaneously, named the parties to the
action and defined the damages to be recovered.20 The current form
of Florida's operative death act, roughly corresponding to Section 1
of Lord Campbell's act, appears as follows:
768.01 - Right of action for death.-( 1) Whenever the
death of any person in this state shall be caused by the
wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any
individual or individuals, or by the wrongful act, negli
gence, carelessness or default of any corporation, or by the
wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, or default, of any
agent of any corporation, acting in his capacity of agent
of such corporation ( or by the wrongful act, negligence,
carelessness or default, of any ship, vessel or boat or per
sons employed thereon), and the act, negligence, careless
ness or default, is such as would, if the death had not en
sued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain
18

an action ( or to proceed in rem against the said ship,
vessel or boat, or in personam against the owners thereof,
or those having control of her) and to recover damages in
respect thereof, then and in every such case the person or
persons who, or the corporation ( or the ship, vessel or
boat), which would have been liable in damages if death
had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages
( or if a ship, vessel or boat, to a libel in rem, and her
owners or those responsible for her wrongful act, negli
gence, carelessness or default, to a libel in personam),
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and al
though the death shall have been caused under such cir
cumstances as amount in law to a felony.
( 2) The right of action as set forth in subsection ( 1)
above shall extend to and include actions ex contractu and
ex delicto.
The present version of this statute is the result of two amendments.
The first occurred in 1915,21 and added the provision dealing with
maritime actions. Although the wording of the statute was also
slightly simplified at this time, the parenthetical additions were the
only substantive changes. The second amendment occurred in 1953, 2�
and added the second paragraph to the act and numbered the para
graphs.
Legislative history of the 1915 amendment is apparently non
existent23 though its general intent is clearly manifested by the paren
thetical wording. An established principle of maritime law, as well
as of common law, is that there is no cause of action for wrongful
death due to the tortious acts of another in the absence of state or
federal enabling legislation.24 At the time of the 1915 amendment
there were no federal acts providing a right of action for wrongful
death occurring on navigable waters within a state's territorial
limits.25 However, as early as 1886, the United States Supreme Court
held that in cases involving maritime wrongful death within the
territorial limits of a state, federal courts were obliged to enforce state
created wrongful death actions hut that the ", . . right was subject
to the limitations which have been made a part of its existence...."�6
Consequently, whenever a libel in rem not based on a federal statute
was brought against a vessel in admiralty for wrongful death, the
preliminary question facing federal courts was \\ hether the state's
wrongful death act contemplated vessels as potential defendants. 27
Since most state statutes seemed to provide only in personam actions,
19

plaintiffs were always in danger of suffering adverse holdings based
on the wording of the particula1 statute involved. Undoubtedly, the
parenthetical additions to Florida's death act were intended to serve
a dual purpose: ( 1) to make clear the fact that the act created a
cause of action for maritime torts resulting in wrongful death cog
nizable in admiralty and Florida's substantive law; 28 and (2) to as
sure federal admiralty courts that the act contemplated actions in
rem against the offending vessel as well as actions in personam
against its owners. Seemingly, the parentheses were added merely
to show that the amendment was intended for clarification and to
prevent a break in the continuity of a statute turgidly worded from
the outset.
It is generally agreed that the 1953 addition of the second para
graph to Florida's death act,20 was the direct result of the Florida
Supreme Court's 1951 decision in Whitely v. Webb's City, Jnc. 30 In
that case the court held that a breach of implied warranty of fitness
of a foodstuff was not actionable under Florida's death act which
contemplated only actions ex delicto. The court aligned itself with
the jurisdictions which hold that actions ex contractu are not main
tainable under statutes of the Lord Campbell's type. Though in 1953
legislature no doubt had breach of implied warranty in mind when it
amended the act, it is likely that all deaths attributable to breaches
of contract are now actionable in Florida due to the statute's plain
language.

3. F.S. §768.02 - Parties and Damages. The statutory provision
defining the parties entitled to recovery and the damages recoverable
under the Death Act ( §768.01) was also enacted in 1883. a\ Though
this statute was intended to cover the matters contained in Section II
of Lord Campbell's act, it is immediately noted that the legislature
chose to radically depart from the British scheme of compensation.
The act reads as follows today with those portions added subsequent
to 1883 italicized:
768.02 - Parties; damages; prooiso.-Every such action
shall be brought by and in the name of the widow or hus
band, as the case may be, and where there is neither
widow nor husband surviving the deceased, then the minor
child or children may maintain an action; and where there
is neither widow nor husband, nor minor child or children,
then the action may be maintained by any person or per
sons dependent on such person killed for a support; and
where there is neither of the ahove classes of persons to
20

sue, then the action may be maintained by the executor or
administrator, as the case may be, of the person killed.. In

case of the death of any person solely entitled, or of all
tlie persons ;ointly entitled to sue, before action brought
or before the recovery of a final ;udgment in action brought
by him or them, the right of action or the action as the
case may be, shall survive to the person or persons next
entitled to sue under this section, and in case of the ,leath
of one or more persons ;ointly entitled to sue before action
brouglit or before tl,e recovery of a final judgment in an
action brought by them, tlie right of action or tlie action,
as the case may be, shall survive to tl1e survivor of sucl1
persons so ;ointly entitled to sue; and in every such action
the jury shall give such damages as the party or parties
entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death
of the party killed; provided, that any person or persons to
tvliom a right of action may survive under the provisions
of tliis act shall recover suc/1 damages as by law such per
son or persons are entitled in tlieir own rigl,t to recover,
irrespective of the damages recoverable by the person or
persons tt:lwm lie or tl,ey may succeed.
This statute has been amended a single time when its length was
practically doubled.3� Since it established a strict hierarchy of bene
ficiaries with the cause of action solely created for the benefit of the
person or persons standing in the specified relationship to the de
ceased, obviously the question would arise as to the disposition of the
cause of action should the beneficiary or beneficiaries primarily en
titled die before the action was brought or before final judgment.
Under the provisions of Lord Campbell's act this question does not
arise since in all cases the decedent's personal representative was to
recover in behalf of all lineal ascendent or descendent beneficiaries
within two degrees of the deceased and actually damaged by the
wrongful death. No doubt the failure of the legislature to originally
anticipate the "survival" problem may be attributed partially to the
absence of such a provision in Lord Campbell's act and partially to
the failure of the legislature to fully appreciate the ramifications of
its singular departure from the usual Lord Campbell provisions with
respect to parties and damages.
The 1907 amendment which added the underli1wd portions was
clearly intended to show that the action contemplated by the legis
lature was a class action with damages measured solely hy the injuries
sustained by the members of the class living at final judgment. With
21

the death of the member or members of a higher class, it was made
clear that the right of action was to vest immediately in the members
of the class next entitled with damages to be measured only by their
own losses.
No cases have been found which raised the questions alleviated by
this amendment prior to its enactment. It is likely that the 1907
amendment was thus the result of legislative "preventive medicine"
in order to dismiss arguments to the effect that the cause of action
provided survived to the estate of a primary beneficiary, or that the
damages recoverable by lower class beneficiaries should be measured
by those recoverable by the primary class beneficiaries had they sur
vived. In the absence of this amendment, both arguments would have
been plausible.
4. F.S. §768.03 Parties in actions for death of minor child. This
statute is designed to provide a cause of action to the parents of a
child wrongfully killed. Originally enacted in 1899,33 the act provides
an action to the child's father for loss of his common law right to the
child's services until majority and for the mental pain and suffering
of both parents. In the absence of a father, the mother may bring the
action. Today the statute appears as follows with those portions
subsequently added again italicized:
768.03 Parties in actions for death of minor child; dam

ages.-( l) Whenever the death of any minor child shall be
C'.lused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or
default of any individual, or by the wrongful act, negli
gence, carelessness or default of any private association or
persons, or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness
or default of any officer, agent or employee of any private
association of persons, acting in his capacity as such officer,
agent or employee, or by the wrongful act, negligence,
carelessness or default of any corporation, or by the
wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any
officer or agent, or employee of any corporation acting in
his capacity as such officer, agent or employee, the father
of such minor child, or if the father be not living, the
mother may maintain an action against such individual,
private association of persons, or corporation, and may re
cover, not only for the loss of services of such minor child,
but in addition thereto, such sum for the mental pain and
suffering of the parent ( or both parents) if they survive,
as the jury may assess.
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( 2) The right of action as set forth in subsection ( l )
above shall extend to and include actions ex contractu and
ex delicto.
The necessity for adding this enactment to the original statutory
scheme adopted sixteen years before was readily accepted by the
legislature when it was realized that §768.02 prevented an action by
the parents of a deceased child for damages to the parent-child rela
tionship34 since seldom were the parents ", ..persons dependent on
such person killed for a support... ," Again it should be noted that
this problem would not have arisen under Section II of Lord Camp
bell's act which involved parents as beneficiaries, and that the neces
sity for a third death statute is directly attributable to the legislature's
unique departure from Section II in defining the parties eligible for
wrongful death compensation.
In 1913, the italicized portions of paragraph one were added to
the statute3;; though in reality it cannot be said that the statute was
amended. These portions were included on the original enrolled bill
which was passed, but were somehow deleted from the Laws of
Florida as published in 1899. This deletion was carried over into the
General Statutes of 1906. No doubt this was the result of someone's
oversight. Nonetheless, the outcome was to limit the potentially
liable parties to corporations and associations. Individuals were left
unaffected.86 In 1913, the wording of the original bill was restored.
The second paragraph providing for ex contractu actions was not
enacted until 1963, 37 exactly ten years after the very same provision
was added to the original death act ( §768.01 ) . There is no valid
reason why the two additions were not enacted at the same time, and
the draftsman of the 1953 amendment to §768.01 probably overlooked
the necessity for a similar addition to §768.03. The 1961 case of
Latimer o. Sears Roebuck and Co.38 forced the issue when in a lengthy
decision a federal court held that the amendment to §768.01 could
not be applied to §768.03. The statute was amended to allow ex con
tractu actions at the next legislative session.

C. Comparison of Florida death acts and Lord Campbell's Act.
Florida's wrongful death acts are in several ways similar to Lord
Campbell's act. Both acts create an entirely new cause of action when
a death is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another.
The Florida act replaces "neglect" with "negligence" and adds "care
lessness" as a basis for liability, but these slight variances in wording
are of no legal significance. Both acts also recognize that the cause
of action is that of the named beneficiaries to whom recovery is
23

limited with damages to be awarded according to the losses actually
suffered. Recovery is also limited by both statutes to those cases
where the decedent would have had a valid cause of action for per
sonal injuries had death not ensued.
At this point, however, the two statutory schemes clearly diverge.
The similarities noted above prevent the conclusion that the two
statutes are totally dissimilar in theory.39 Yet, sharp differences
appear in the actual operation of the two enactments. First, it is
immediately noticed that Florida has established a strict hierarchy of
beneficiary classes.10 This hierarchy determines who possesses the
cause of action, who may bring suit, and who may recover damages.
Lord Campbell's act requires the deceased's personal representative
to bring the action, recovering those damages suffered by the dead
person's lineal relatives within two degrees, the Florida act requires
that the action be brought by the member or members of that hier
archial class having priority as established by the statute and that
damages he limited solely to the members of that class. Also unlike
Lord Campbell's act, Florida does not necessarily limit recovery to
lineal relatives of the deceased, but includes a separate beneficiary
class for any dependent persons. Under Florida's act, the estate of
the decedent also is included as a separate beneficiary class provided
the deceased was not survived by a prior class. Lord Campbell's act
contains no provision for recovery to the estate.
Florida's departure from the usual Lord Campbell provisions was
obviously the result of compromise. No doubt many legislators feared
that courts of the state would be smothered by wrongful death actions
resulting in excessive damages. Others probably felt that Lord Camp
bell's act was too restrictive as to parties allowed to recover. The
compromise remedy finally adopted has bred more ills than it pre
vented, H but, as one author has noted, other states have had similar
experiences.12
.. ( T)he example set by our brothers-in-law across the sea
was followed in the United States, but with many un
fortunate results. Few of the state acts followed Lord
Camphell's Act strictly in language; many used their own
conceptions of what the act was about; 1md most were
confused as to the kind of cause of action created. All were
agreed, howewr, that they had adopted Lord Campbell's
Act or a reasonable facsimile thereof. The result has been
confusion compounded across several states of the United
States, and Florida has not been left untouched."
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V. SURVEY OF AMERICAN DEATH ACTS
AND THE FLORIDA ACTS
A. Acts giving rise to liability. The substantive basis of recovery
for wrongful death must be determined by reference to the language
of any statute purporting to change the common law rule. Lord
Campbell's Act provided that there would be liability for the death
of a person if death resulted from the ·•...wrongful act, neglect, or
default ... " of the defendant. The statutes of twenty-six states have
adopted this language intact. Of the remaining jurisdictions, most
have only slightly varied the wording while providing essentially the
same basis for recovery.1 :i Florida is in the latter category.
Florida Statutes §§768.01 and 768.03 predicate the defendant's
liability upon his "... wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or de
fault..." Why the legislature chose to depart from Lord Campbell's
formulation by inserting "carelessness" as a basis for liability is un
known. The negligent man by definition is careless. Perhaps this
insertion was the result of a desire for statutory originality. More
p lausible is the suggestion that it was added to clarify the statute's .
purpose by inserting a lay term among legal words of art. The term
has been accorded no special significance by the courts and may be
viewed as surplusage.
I. Torts. It is well settled that the commission of a common law
intentional tort resulting in the victim's death will qualify as a
"wrongful act" for purposes of a wrongful death cause of action.H
If the death is due to circumstances amounting in law to a felony, the
Florida Act expressly prevents the common law doctrine of merger
from operating and thereby extinguishing the civil claim. Likewise,
if the defendant owes a duty of care to the decedent and breaches
that duty causing the decedent's death, an action for wrongful death
may be based on negligence. It is important to recognize that the
duty breached by the defendant is one owed to the decedent, not to
his survivors, even though the losses for which damages. are recover
able are usually those suffered by the survivors.
Whether death is the result of intentional or negligent injury must

be determined under the substantive tort law of each jurisdiction.

Florida law recognizes that an intentional wrongful act causing death
is to be distinguished from negligence and that different defenses may
apply to intentional and negligent acts though they both create the
same cause of action.15
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2. Strict Liability. All jurisdiction recognizing actions for personal
injury based upon strict liability without fault permit a wrongful
death action where a fatality results from such activity.46 When first
accepted in the United States, strict liability was applied solely to
dangerous activities such as dynamite blasting. The recent trend,
however, has been the extension of strict liability to many inherently
dangerous activities. This has been most striking in the area of defec
tive products liability where a movement has begun to replace breach
of warranty with strict liability.47 There are indications that Florida
courts have joined in this movement.48 It is possible that further
changes in the direction of increased strict liability will occur in
Florida. Should this development continue, death actions based upon
non-negligent "defaults" for which the defendent is strictly liable
may be allowed by Florida courts.
3. Breach of Contract. It is generally accepted that damages re
sulting from death caused by a breach of contract are not recoverable
under wrongful death statutes of the Lord Campbell type. Recovery
for death due to breach of contract was disallowed at common law,
and it is often stated that wrongful death statutes were intended only
to apply to actions ex delicto.49 Yet, it might be possible for courts
to consider a breach of contract a "default" in order to render it ac
tionable under the traditional statutory language.
Florida Statutes §§768.01 and 768.03 expressly provide for wrong
ful death actions to extend to "actions ex contractu." The legislative
history of the 1953 amendment adding this additional basis for lia
bility indicates that death actions based on breach of warranty were
mainly contemplated. The clear language of the amendment is not
restricti\'e, however, and no doubt any breach of contract legally
causing death is actionable under Florida's death acts. 50
4. Breach of Warranty. Personal injury actions based upon breach
of warranty have greatly multiplied in recent years due to the ex
panded scope of liability in products liability cases. Breach of war
ranty is a hybrid action containing elements of both contract and tort
theory. Earlier cases, emphasizing the ex contractu nature of warranty
actions, firmly disallowed recovery for wrongful death based upon
breach of warranty. 31 The recent trend, however, has been to view
breach of warranty as a non-negligent "default" to which strict lia
bility is applicable. The 1953 amendment to F.S. §768.01 was clearly
intended to allow a wrongful death action on a breach of implied
warranty theory.52
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5. Unseaworthiness. Due care does not discharge the duty of a
shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel for his seamen. Unsea
worthiness is a type of strict liability known only to judge-made
maritime law. 53 This theory of liability provides a cause of action
generally not recognized in state courts since admiralty jurisdiction
is vested in the federal courts.
In the absence of Federal legislation, death actions based upon
maritime personal injuries occurring within the navigable waters of
a state must be brought, if at all, under the provisions of the state
wrongful death act. 54 Assuming it is found that a state's act contem
plates such actions ( as Florida's acts expressly do), the state's sub
stantive law is applicable both with respect to the necessary elements
for the cause of action and to available defenses. If the vessel's un
seaworthiness is relied upon as the cause of the fatality, the question
arises whether unseaworthiness can be the basis of a cause of action
under the state's substantive law. The Florida Supreme Court has
recently held, in accordance with the majority of states, that substan
tive principles exclusively maritime in nature are not cognizable in
actions brought under Florida's death acts regardless of the fact that
the decedent could have relied upon those principles had he lived
and sued in the federal courts for personal injuries."" This holding
applies both to the complaint based upon unseaworthiness and to the
maritime defense of comparative negligence.56

B. Tl1eories of Damages. Since monetary compensation is the ob
ject of wrongful death acts, it is not strange that methods of damage
computation present the distinguishing characteristics for classifying
American wrongful death statutes. Nearly all American statutes are
of the Lord Campbell's type with regard to the party liable and to
the necessary acts establishing liability. By contrast, there are various
theories of damage computation which determine who possesses the
cause of action, who is to receive compensation, and what elements
of loss may be recovered.
American wrongful death statutes, then, can be classified according
to how they compensate for the losses caused by a death-producing
act. These losses are of three types. First, there are those damages
personal to the decedent. Secondly, there arc those economic losses
consequent upon the decedent's ceasing to function as an economic
unit. The third broad classification of potential damages are those
generated by the non-economic loss of the decedent as a unique
human being who is valued by his family. Though it is true that the
courts and legislatures of the United States have accepted many vary27

ing formulas for compensating these losses, some generalization is
possible.
l. Survival Stat11tes. Most states provide survival statutes whereby
a cause of action for damages personal to the decedent survives to
his estate_:,; A survival action is conceptually different from a wrong
ful death action since each provides a remedy for a different loss.
Unlike most wrongful death acts, survival statutes provide compen
sation to the personal representative of the deceased for those personal
injuries suffered by the deceased up to the date of death. Needless
to say, recovery is disallowed where the decedent is killed instantly
since no damage to the deceased occurs during his lifetime. Several
jurisdictions have adopted hybrid death acts providing for recovery of
elements of both survival and wrongful death damages.:,s These have
bred confusion. It is no doubt better policy to prevent more than one
action hased upon the same act, but a mixture in a single statute of
two conceptually different theories of damages may he confusing
unless clarity can be achieved through careful legislative drafting.
The elements of damages generally recoverable by a decedent's
personal representative in a survival action are as follows: conscious
pain and suffering, medical expenses, funeral and burial expenses,;;o
and loss of earnings to date of death.
In jurisdictions like Florida where the sur\'ival action is separate
and distinct from an action for wrongful death, the recovered dam
ages are assets of the decedent's estate subject to the claims of credi
tors, and distributable by will or intestate succession if there is no will.
2. Loss to Survivors Death Acts. While survival statutes only
compensate the estate of the decedent for those damages personally
suffered by him prior to death, wrongful death acts create a new cause
of action for damages either to the estate or survivors of the deceased
caused by the loss of the deceased as a producing economic unit.
Most death acts also permit damages based upon the loss to his family
of the decedent as a unique individual. There are many elements of
damages which may be considered by a legislature or court when it
attempts to compensate for losses caused by an actionable death, and
without doubt there are many combinations of damage elements pos
sible. As a concession to the shortness of human life however let us
generalize with regard to those few combinations which most 'Ameri
can jurisdictions have found acceptable and from this gain insight
into the underlying policy bases for allowing monetary recovery for
wrongful death.
A majority of state and federal death acts adopt the loss to sur-
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vivors theory of damages. Even where the particular act does not
specify how damages should he computed, the courts ha\'c generally
accepted this theory. The reason for this weight of authority is
partially found in the fact that Lord Campheirs Act expressly pro
vided for damages " ...proportional to the injury ..." to specifically
designated beneficiaries. More convincing is the consideration that
the law should most interest itself in the protection of the living who
have been injured hy the decedent's death. Damages should he com
puted with an eye toward the losses of thrn,e dependents who will
actually receive compensation and not toward the decedent or his
estate.
Though Lord Campbell's Act provided a rather broad standard for
jury awards, it was judicially restricted to pecuniary damages only
without any recovery for "sentimental" losses."" �lost American jurb
dictions adopting Lord Campbell's type statutes provide that dam,1ges
are to be computed in accordance with the losses suffered by the
decedent's survivors. A majority of these have also restricted recovery
to pecuniary losses, either by statutory provision or hy judici.ll con
struction of general language. This restriction is for the most part
illusory, however, since many courts have been willing to allow the
jury to place a pecuniary value upon items difficult to evaluate such
as loss of services, companionship, and training. Generally, tlw pecu
niary loss restriction has been applied to prevent recovery for mental
pain and anguish of the survivors.
Damages under the loss to survivors theory, then, arc awarded for
the pecuniary value reduced to present worth of the prob,tble con
tributions to support which the deceased would have nude to the
survivors had he lived and for tht• value of the st•rvict•s which the
decedent normally would have rendered to the survivors. In most
states this includes the value of a parent's training, guid,mce, com
panionship, and education. These items of damages are computed
based upon the joint life expectancies of both the decedent and each
individual beneficiary. In addition, some states allow recovery for
the present value of the probable inheritance the survivor� would
have received had the decedent lived out his normal life span. In
those states having hybrid survival-de.1th statutes, the decedent's
medical and funeral expenses are often allowed.
Florida's death acts incorporate the loss to survivors theory of dam
ages. This is singularly complicated, however, by the strict hierarchy
of beneficiary classes which F.S. §768.02 erects and by the inclusion
of the decedent's estate as a separatl> beneficiary class in the absence
of living dependents. Like Lord Campbell's Act, the Florida statutes,
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except for the Wrongful Death of Minors Act (F.S. §768.03), provide
little guidance for damage computation. This has resulted in much
litigation with questionable results, which the Florida courts have
recognized.
Unlike most jurisdictions which usually allow recovery by all de
pendents of the decedent, Florida prevents recovery except to those
highest in the beneficiary hierarchy. Damage computations are de
pendent upon the identity of the person suing. All persons in fact
dependent upon the decedent may recover the present value of lost
support or services81 provided, of course, that they are members of
the class entitled to bring suit. In the case of a surviving spouse,
damages are also allowed for lost comfort, protection, society, com
panionship and consortium.62 In addition, a surviving widow may
recover the loss of that amount which she may reasonably have ex
pected to receive as a legacy from her husband's estate.63 Though
Florida does not subscribe to the "pecuniary loss" restriction, a sur
viving spouse may not recover for mental pain and suffering.64 In an
action by minor children, loss of attention, care, comfort, education
and moral training may be compensated6;; as well as lost services
and support. Where the decedent is a minor child, F.S. §768.03
authorizes a separate cause of action for the parents who would ordi
narily be unable to hring themselves within one of the beneficiary
classes of F.S. §768.02. In an action by a parent, the allowable re
covery includes loss of the child's services to majority and mental
pain and suffering of both parents. In such a situation, there may
also be a cause of action under F.S. §768.01 on behalf of the minor
decedent's estate.66
3. Loss to estate death acts. There are basically four types of
death acts which measure damages either wholly or partially by the
loss sustained by the decedent's estate. Eight jurisdictions have
enacted hybrid survival-death acts which are essentially survival ac
tions for the decedent's personal injuries expanded to include damages
for wrongful death. Since the cause of action is viewed technically as
a survival to the decedent's estate with wrongful death losses added,
damages are entirely measured by loss to the estate and are recovered
for the benefit of the estate. Although recovery is to the estate, most
statutes of this type require distribution to designated statutory bene
ficiaries. Others, however, treat the recovery as personal property
of the estate distributable either by will or intestate succession after
payment of debts of the decedent.
The remaining three classes of statutes allowing recovery measured
by the loss to decedent's estate are distinguishable from the hybrid

survival-death statutes in that they create an entirely new cause of
action. Like most "true" death acts, these statutes do not recognize
the cause of action as merely a legal survival of the decedent's estate.
The first group of these statutes are those of the Lord Campbell
type which provide only general directions for damage computation
by the jury. In several states, the language has been judicially con
strued to measure damages by loss to the decedent's estate although,
once recovered, the damages are immediately distributed to the
designated statutory beneficiaries without becoming property of the
estate subject to debts and testamentary dispositions.
A second group of "true" death acts measure damages by loss to
survivors, but in addition allow the decedent's personal representative
to recover certain losses to the estate. These generally are losses
resulting from the injury and death such as funeral and medical ex
penses. Generally, this type of death act is found in jurisdictions
either without survival statutes or with death acts expressly preempt
ing the survival cause of action.
The last group of loss to estate death acts measure damages by loss
to survivors where they exist, but provide for loss to the estate under
specified circumstances. One is Florida's, which provides that if the
decedent is not survived by statutory beneficiaries the action ..may be
maintained by the executor or administrator ...of the person killed."
Under statutes of this type loss to the estate in general may be re
covered.
There are three different theories of damage measurement utilized
where loss to estate is recoverable. The least important of the three
is a recovery based upon the decedent's probable gross earnings re
duced to present value and without deduction for decedent's personal
living expenses. Only a few states accept this method of measure
ment, and of these it is suspected that there is a desire to compensate
beneficiaries for "sentimental" losses in a disguised manner. Georgia,
for example, permits recovery of the gross estate only where the action
is brought by the spouse or child of the decedent or by the parents of
a minor decedent.
The most popular theory of loss to estate measurement is that
monetary damages should represent the present value of decedent's
probable future net earnings. This figure is found by determining the
probable future gross earnings of the decedent over his life expectancy
and deducting therefrom his probable personal living expenses. The
figure is then discounted to present value.
Another theory of recovery to the estate subscribed to hy several
states is to measure damages by the present value of decedent's prob-
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able future accumulations. 61 This is the Florida position when there
is no survivor in the three prior classes. Like the probable "net in
come" theory, this method of measurement relies solely on probable
business income without regard to possible investment income.68 The
future accumulations theory, however, requires that the jury deter
mine the amount of decedent's net earnings he would have saved and
left at his death as part of his estate. Though it is indeed a fine line
which separates the "net earning" theory from the "future accumu
lations" theory, the latter seems more equitable since the jury must
not only evaluate the decedent's propensity to earn but also his pro
pensity to save. In Florida, the jury is allowed to consider the habits,
skill, age, and health of the decedent in determining his probable
accumulations. 60 This approach is probably more difficult to apply,
however, since the jury must objectively evaluate the subjective per
sonality traits of the decedent.
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VI. DEFECTS IN THE FLO HI DA LAW OF
WRONGFUL DEATH
Crave difficulties were created by the unique departure from the
usual Lord Campbell provisions in F.S. §768.02. The strict hierarchy
of beneficiary classes created by this enactment, in the final analysis,
must be recognized as the most serious defect. Florida's death acts
have caused so much injustice and confusion that the Supreme Court
has been prompted to request legislative revision.70 The ideal death
act should require the tortfeasor to respond in one civil action for the
actual losses of those living dependents of the deceased. The wrong
ful death laws of Florida do not achieve this ideal. Further, a great
deal of unfairness is possible in Florida to both dependents of the
deceased and the tortfeasor.
A. Mechanics. Rather than one comprehensive death act providing
for one civil action, Florida has four acts that may come into play
when a person causes a fatal injury, and they create three different
causes of action. The survival statute provides recovery of those
damages personal to the decedent suffered prior to death.11 These
include medical and funeral expenses, lost earnings, and mental pain
and suffering. This cause of action survives to the decedent's estate
and may be brought by his personal representative.
An additional cause of action is created upon death by F.S. §768.01
for the injuries sustained by the survivors of the decedent. F.S. §768.02
provides a hierarchy of beneficiary classes that determines who may
sue, who may share in the recovery, and, to some extent, what losses
will be compensated. This hierarchy is as follows:
(I) surviving spouse; ( 2) minor children; ( 3) other dependent per
sons; and ( 4) the decedent's estate. Actually, "estate" is not men
tioned; rather, the statute provides that the action may be maintained
"by the executor or administrator ... of the person killed". The cause
of action is vested exclusively in the highest beneficiary class. Mem
bership in the highest class has been recognized as an essential
element of the cause of action.72 Members of a lower class cannot
sue even if the existing class having priority refuses to do so;13 the
cause of action cannot be assigned to those of a lower class;74 and
only members of the class with priority may recover damages after
having alleged and proven the non-existence of a higher class.75 Unless
the beneficiary suing under the death acts is also the decedent's
personal representative, the tortfeasor must respond to two separate
actions, one for wrongful death and one for surviving personal in33

juries. Even if such joinder is possible, it is not compulsory and the
plaintiff may elect to afflict the defendant with two lawsuits.
The damages recoverable under the Florida death acts depend
upon the i<lentity of the person suing. These may be briefly sum
marized according to each statutory class:
( I ) Surviving spouse - lost financial support, services, comfort,
protection, society and corsortium. Lost inheritance and the
existence of minor children may he considered if the support
of the minor children has been thrust upon the surviving
spouse hy the death of the husband and father.
( 2) �finor children - lost financial support, services, attention, care,
companionship, and educational and moral training.
( 3) Other <.k•pemlent persons - lost support and service only. Dam
age� for these three classes are computed according to the "loss
to �urvi\·ors" theory.
( 4) Decedent's estat<.• - lost savings that decedent probably would
h,n-e accumulated had he lived.
The inclusion of the <lece<lent·s estate as the last beneficiary class
produces a switch to the ..loss to estate" theorv of damages and of
cour�e, b depend<.·nt upon the non-existence of '.my person depemient
upon the deceased.
Under Florid.i's fourth act aff<.•cting the problem, F.S. §768.o:3 pro
vides the parents of a deceased minor child with a third and distinct
cause of action for loss of the common law right to the child's services
and for mental pain and suffering. This is the only death statute pro
viding <.·xplidt directions for damage awards and the only one under
which mental pain an<l suffering of the plaintiffs may he recovered.
This Wro11g/11/ Deatl, of Minors Act was created due to the short
comings produc-ed hy the beneficiary hierarchy of F.S. §768.02 since
seldom W<.'H' the parents dependents of their minor children. The
problems prL•seuted by F.S. §768.0:3 are a product of the flaws in the
earlier death legislation of Florida.
A had f<..ature of F.S. §768.0:3 is that it can result in further multi
plicity of suits. Though as a practical matter minors seldom have
dependeuts or per�onal representatives other than their parents, it
is not impossible that a tortfeasor would have to respond to three
separate ci\'il actions by three separate plaintiffs. Assuming a working
minor with a dependent friend or relative other than a parent and
\\"ho has appoiuted a personal representative other than a parent by
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will, two separate death actions and a separate survival action are
theoretically possible. Three causes of action in favor of a p.1renl of
a deceased minor child are common, and it is possible for the plain
tiff to sue on them separately. Obviously, the possibility of harrass
ment of the defendant exists.
B. Factual examples. The defects in Florida's death acts can he
illustrated by examples. To show the mechanics of the act, assume
that II, a middle aged man, is neglig<.•ntly killed hy T and h �ur\'in·d
hy a wife, \V, a minor son, S, and a minor daughter, D. 11 also sup
ports his elderly mother, 1\1, who resides with the famil\'. Under
Florida law, only \V may maintain a death action for da;nages ex
clusively personal to her. Although it has long hem held that the
existence of minor chil<lren may lw considered by the jury,'" \V's
recovery is strictly for her only without a portion allowe<l cxdusi\'l'lv
to the childn•n as such. The mother and childn·n of II arc \\'ithou·t
remedy for their loss due to the existence of \V. Yd, their losses are
no less real. This unfairness can he intensified by assuming the fol
lowing: (I) W is a second wife to II and a �tepmotlwr to the chil
dren, and she l'ither chooses not to sue or sues onh· for herself �incc
she is not responsible for the children's support. m: ( 2) D b an ado
lescent girl who suffPrs seV<.'fl' psychologieal trauma due to hl'r htther's
death and n·quirl'� p�yc-hiatric hl'lp. In both ca�1•s therl' b 11<1 n·
co\'ery by the children though their actual los,L·� may h<· great. The
existence of \V also preclucles any reco\'ery to the <·�tale ex('ept under
the survival statute, which may produce little for the children after
creditors have been satisfied, and there will he no sur\'in1l action if
the death was instantaneous.
Multiplicity of law suits is possihk• by the fact that both W aud
the dece<lent's personal representative may be different persons who
must sue T separately, or, even if the same person, may elect to pro
ceed in two separate actions. It has alreadv heen shown how the
death of a minor may result in a third lawst;it. Assuming that three
interests which the law should protect have been d,unaged, there is
still no sound rea�on why all three losses cannot he as�ertecl in one
civil action.
Another factual exampk· will point out the uw,atisfactory situation
with regard to damages presented by the Florida death acts. X is a
nineteen year old youth fatally injun•d due to Ts negligence who dies
after a hrid stay in the hospit.tl. To owrsimplify, it is assumed that
X's gross lifetime earnings may be found to lw $200,000 when reduced
to present value. The personal representative of X may recover for
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the mental pain and suffering of X as well as for his lost earnings to
date of death and medical expenses. He will also recover funeral
expenses. If X is survived by a wife, she may recover that portion of
the $200,000 which the jury reasonably believes would have been
spent for her support had X lived. Assuming that X has two small
children, that portion of X's probable gross earnings that would have
been spent on them is not recoverable except as part of the wife's
damages. Similarly, no recovery will be allowed X's estate for that
portion of the $200,000 which X probably would have accumulated
as savings though this amount would have been recoverable by his
estate ( fourth class) had X not been survived by immediate depend
ents. The anomolous result, according to the Florida Supreme Court
is that "... the wrongdoer (is) required to respond in a less amount
of damages if the injured person dies, than if the injured person sur
vives ..."77 since if X had lived with a total and permanent disability
he would be allowed to recover the present entire value of the
$200,000 as impaired earning capacity in addition to his other personal
injury damage elements.
A further anomaly results from the fact that a person's earnings
normally are spent on family and personal expenses with only the
remainder being accumulated as savings. The more dependents a
person has, the less he will probably accumulate. F.S. §768.02 allows
but one class of dependents to recover to the exclusion of all others.
Yet when the decedent is survived by no dependents, his personal
representative may recover the entire net estate as accumulated sav
ings, which may he disproportionately large in the absence of de
pendents. As the Florida Supreme Court has again pointed out, in
many cases "...it might he said that it is cheaper to kill a person
who leaves a spouse or child ... than it is to kill a person who is
survived by no one..."78 Seemingly, the Florida death acts are capa
ble of discriminating against those persons whom the law should
most zealously protect in favor of collateral kin, who receive not sup
port but a windfall. Stated otherwise, recoveries are small where
actual losses are great, and recoveries are large where actual losses
are small. This is indefensible.
This problem becomes particularly disturbing in the case of the
wrongful death of a minor child. The parents of the dead child are
given a cause of action by F.S. §768.03 for the value of the child's
services during minority and for mental pain and suffering presumably
because F.S. §768.01 does not permit mental pain and suffering to be
recovered and F.S. §768.02 does not even include parents as a class
that can sue as such. There is also an action arising under F.S.§768.01,
36

and usually the only class in existence will be the estate. So the father
of the dead child can recover as personal representative of the child's
estate the lost accumulations of the child figured from his majority
and this amount will he distributed to the child's parents under
Florida's laws of intestate succession. As noted in the preceeding
paragraph, the probable accumulated savings of a person without de
pendents-and minors usually are-may be found to be very great.
Add this recovery to that possible under F.S. §768.03, and it may be
concluded that Florida's death acts theoretically allow the highest
recovery in the case of a minor's death where he is survived by par
ents but by no dependent persons. Parents of minor children, there
fore, may not only recover larger pecuniary damages than dependents
of decedents generally, but, unlike a surviving spouse and children,
are also allowed recovery for mental pain and suffering. This borders
on the ridiculous when it is realized that parents are seldom viewed
as the primary objects of a person's bounty and that parents seldom
need such large recoveries. Why should it be more expensive to kill
a minor on whom no one is dependent for support than to kill a
breadwinning husband and father?70
The theoretical flaws pointed out above have, of course, been held
in check to a great extent by the common sense of jurors and by the
watchful eye of judges, trial and appellate, which discourage exces
sive verdicts, but that is no excuse for the death acts of Florida to
embody such an irrational and distorted view of public policy. They
should, as a minimum requirement, present a picture of theoretical
consistency in order to aid the courts, which have trouble enough
with the facts of individual cases without having to be concerned
with faulty statutes. The Florida death acts have failed to supply our
judges and juries with a consistent theory of damage recovery that
accords with common sense and public opinion. Large awards where
no one needs it, and small awards where there are many dependents
is nonsense.
C. Miscellaneous problems. There are several other problems with
regard to wrongful death worthy of legislative consideration. Some
of these have been presented to our courts and have been reasonably
resolved by them even though Florida's death acts do not expressly
deal with them.
With regard to damages, recovery for the mental pain and suffering
of the surviving spouse or children of the decedent has been dis
allowed under the Florida acts.80 Though it is the general rule today
that damages of this type are not recoverable under the "loss to sur37

vivors" theory, the Legislature of Florida in the Wrongful Death of
Minors Act ( F.S. §768.03) has clearly manifested a belief that these
damages do occur and can be en1luatecl. �lost jurisdictions refuse to
allow the mental anguish type of damage hecause the courts say there
is no precise method for arriving at ,1 monetary ernluation. The flaw
in this argument lies in the fact that a majority of jurisdictions allow
recowry for lost companionship, an element of loss that is also clearly
without a price tag. It is also worth noting that, to a large extent,
all lo�sPs caused hy a wrongful death are somewhat speculative. Per
haps the best explanation for the disallowance of mental pain and
suffering is a distrust of the jury's competence to arrive at a just award
based upon an element of damages that is negative in quality. The
emotional effects of a death upon close relatives is distinguishahle
from those more posili\'e elements of damages such as the money and
st·n in·s that the decedent would have contributed to the survivors
had lw li\'ed. Yet, most juries at present have adequate opportunity
to make awards based upon sentiment an<l sympathy, and the addi
tion of one more ··non-pecuniary" element of loss could make little
difforence. The justice of such an addition, on the other hand, would
particularly manifest itself in those cases where the dependent's men
tal damage has resulted in positively identifiable physical or psychi
atric ilhwss. These damages can reasonably be established through
expert medical testimony. Medical science is not so helpless in assess
ing mental anguish and its effects as it was when the rule disallowing
this d.unage element \\·as adopted by the courts.
Another problem is the protection of the decedent's genern1 credi
tor�. General creditors of the decedent have priority in survival statute
reco\'eries as against the decedent's survivors. Further, all wrongful
death recm·eries by the estate in the ahsence of dependents under
F.S. �768.02 are subject to the claims of creditors. The problem arisl•s
solelr in the case of the surviving spouse who may recover her lost
inheritance without its being subject to the claims of creditors. Firmly
established is the legal policy that no beneficiary of an estate should
be allowed to receive his legacy prior to the satisfaction of decedent's
creditors.
The problem of creditors' claims cannot he discussed without also
comidering the question of recon-ry for lost inheritanCl' hy statutory
bl·lll'ficiaril·s other than widows. Probable inheritance of statutory
beneficiaries is recognizl•d in the majority of "'loss to sun-ivors" juris
dictions as a valid expectancy to be legally protected. Florida courts
allow recm·ery for a widow's probable inheritance•, hut not for that
of minor children or other depc•ndents. The difficulty with computing
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lost inheritance h that the jur). in addition to computing the othl'r
losses to survivors, must also determim· the dl'cedcnt'� probable ac
cumulations and the likl'lihood of a portion !wing ldt to the particul.tr
beneficiary. Yet, if this difficulty is not controlling where widows arc
concerned, wlw arc children not allowed a recon·1-y of their expect
ancy also?
The allowance of an inheritance recovery under the "loss lo �ur
vivors" theory may he undesirable in two r<'�pects. First, it permit�
payment of what is nrnch like a legacy clirl'ct to th<" hc1wficiary with
out its having passed through the decedent's e�tale thereby becoming
subject to the claims of creditor�. Secondly, it may he unfair to the
defendant, whose liability may he based on simpk· negligence, to he
required to act as an insurer of a legacy to tlw parents or collatl'ral
relatives of an unmarried decedent who nl'ither n<"ed nor expect such
a windfall since the,· would not normally h<" th<" objects of the dece
dent's hountv. One ·solution lo this problem would he to shift a ""los�
to estate" th�ory so as lo permit, a� .1dclitional d,1111,1ges, rccon.'ry h)
the personal rcprcspnlalive of the net accumul.ttions for purposes of
presl'rving expectancies. 81 This recovery would he subject to the
claims of creditors, dislrihutahlc by will or by intestacy, and could
he disallowed except wlll're the decedc•nl is survin·d hy a �pouse or
children, the most natural objects of hb bounty.
Another aspect of the wrongful death problem not clearly covered
by Florida's death acts concerns the rights of adopted and illegitimatt
children.
In summary, the following are the major problem areas in Florida's
death acts:

( 1) The strict hierarchy of beneficiary classes pstahlished hy F.S.
§768.02, which blocks recovery of real losses.
(2) The possibility of multiple causes of action hase<l on a singlP

tortious act resulting in court congestion, complexity, and pos
sible harrassmcnt.

( 3) The absence of guides for damages computation including a
specification of recoverable elements.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOH HEVISION
1. Replace the three death acts with a comprehensive ,vrongful
Death Act.
2. The comprehensive act should he remedial, not punitive, and
a policy statement should require a liberal interpretation where jus
tice demands.
3. The personal representative of the decedent should recover on
behalf of all eligible survivors and the estate, if the estate is to re
cover, in one civil action. If there is to be a recovery on behalf of
all beneficiaries, the personal representative of the decedent is the
most logical plaintiff.
4. Although the act should contain an expanded ''loss to survivors"
theory of damages, a recovery should be allowed the estate for losses
heretofore allowed under the survival statute, and lost accumul,ttions
should be recoverable to the estate under certain defined circum
stances. No longer should a separate surviving cause of action he
allowed the estate for personal injuries of the deceased where the
injury has resulted in a wrongful death, hut all damages would be
recoverable in the wrongful death action.
5. Potentially liable parties should be simplified to specify any
person or watercraft. This would neither contract nor expand those
parties presently liable, and would dispense with some of the admi
ralty terms and turgid language currently found in F.S. §768.01.
6. Liability should be based upon the wrongful act, negligence,
default, or breach of contract or warranty of the defendant. "Care
lessness" as a term of art is synonomous with "negligence" and omit
ting it will leave the meaning unchanged. As to "breach of contract,"
there is no reason to write Florida statutes in Latin. ..,varranty" needs
to be mentioned to avoid confusion arising from developments in
strict liability.
7. No wrongful death action should be recognized except in those
cases where the decedent could have recovered for personal injuries
had he survived.
8. Damages should be calculated from the time of in;ury, not from
the time of death. This will permit the recovery of damages now
recoverable in a separate survival action for personal injury, except
for pain and suffering of the decedent. This recognizes the fact that
the dead are beyond compensation for either physical or mental suf-
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fering. The personal representative should also be allowed to recover
on behalf of the decedent's survivors in the following manner utilizing
the "loss to survivors" theory:
a. A spouse and all blood relatives dependent in whole or in part
upon the decedent should be allowed to recover the full value of lost
support and services calculated from the time of injury to date of
judgment plus interest. The present value of future lost support and
services may also be recovered.
b. A surviving spouse should also recover for lost companionship
and protection as well as for mental pain and suffering to be calcu
lated from the date of injury. Loss of consortium should not be com
pensated as such since this legal term of art is misunderstood by many
jurors to represent merely sexual activity.
c. Surviving minor children also should be allowed to recover lost
parental companionship, instruction, and guidance. A recovery for
their mental pain and suffering should also be recoverable from the
date of injury. The recovery should not be restricted to legitimate
children.
d. Parents of a deceased minor child should also be allowed to
recover mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.

11. The court in its discretion should be allowed to protect the
amounts recovered for minor children and incompetents by the per
sonal representative.
12. Compromise settlements must receive court approval to be
effective if any survivor is a minor or incompetent or if any survivor
objects to the proposed compromise.
13. The award to each survivor and the estate should each bear
a share of the expenses of litigation including attorney fees in pro
portion to the amount awarded to each.

9. Those damages recoverable by the personal representative on
behalf of the estate utilizing the "loss to estate" theory should include
the following:
a. Loss of earnings of the decedent from the date of injury to the
date of death less lost support of survivors. These losses should not
be computed beyond the death unless the decedent is survived by a
spouse or lineal descendants. If this is the case, net accumulations
should also be calculated for the decedent's life expectance and re
duced to present value. Any recovery of net accumulations should be
distributed either by will or the Florida probate law after having first
satisfied the claims of creditors.
b. Hospital and medical expenses and funeral expenses should be
recoverable by the personal representative or by a survivor who has
actually paid them.
c. The decedent's pain and suffering should not be allowed since
this element of damage has had substituted for it the pain and suffer
ing of close relatives.
10. Each survivor's share shall be separately stated in the verdict
of the trier, and the recovery allowed the estate shall also be sepa
rately stated.
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